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Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 8(c):
Assessing the Proper Standard to
Apply to Affirmative Defenses
James V. Bilek*
“The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems
created by the preceding generation’s procedural reforms.”1

INTRODUCTION
For almost fifty years, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2
have required parties simply to provide each other with fair
notice of their claims or defenses.3 However, in 2007, the
Supreme Court interpreted Rule 8 to mean something quite
different.4 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly5 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,6 the Supreme Court changed the pleading standard from
one requiring the complaint to provide the defendant with “fair
notice” of the claim,7 to one requiring the complaint to contain
* J.D. Candidate, Chapman University School of Law, expected 2012. For my
family, especially my parents James and Karen Bilek, for without their support and
guidance, I would surely have been unable to make it through law school, let alone write
this Comment. I would also like to especially thank my grandparents, Thomas and Anne
Haldorsen, and Victor and Marion Bilek. They have taught me so much about the value
of hard work, family, and life in general, that I doubtless would be able to summarize it in
words. It is enough to say that they have shown me the importance of family in one’s life.
1 Judith Resnick, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 624 (1985).
2 Hereinafter, unless stated in full, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be
referred to simply as “the Rules.”
3 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (“[A]ll the Rules require is ‘a short
and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))),
abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See also Woodfield v.
Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An affirmative defense is subject to the same
pleading requirements as is the complaint.”).
4 Rule 8 governs complaints and affirmative defenses in federal courts. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(a) (governing complaints); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (governing affirmative defenses).
5 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
7 This “fair notice” standard was fairly simple for a plaintiff to meet. See Green
Country Food Mkt., Inc. v. Bottling Grp., LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1279 (10th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a complaint must give the defendant “‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’ . . . [but that a] plaintiff should not be
prevented from pursuing a claim simply because of a failure to set forth in the complaint
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“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”8 Yet, while the Court may have announced the standard
for complaints, it was silent as to what to do with affirmative
defenses pled in an answer.9 Must a defendant continue to
simply provide the plaintiff with fair notice of the affirmative
defense?10
Or, must the defendant’s answer now “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a[n
affirmative defense] that is plausible on its face[?]’”11 Without an
answer to these questions, defendants seeking to assert an
affirmative defense will have little guidance as to what they must
now include in their answers. These questions and issues have
inspired this Comment, which will examine how Twombly and
Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses. Ultimately, this Comment
proposes that a defendant must “plead an adequate factual basis
for [his or her] affirmative defense[],”12 without having to give
rise to an affirmative defense which is ‘plausible on its face.’”13
To require a defendant to make a plausibility assessment prior to
pleading an affirmative defense would discourage defendants
from pleading otherwise legitimate defenses out of fear that they
may lack sufficient support to prove their plausibility.14
a theory on which the plaintiff could recover . . . .” (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47,
abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))). Thus, under this “notice”
standard, facts were not necessarily required to be pled, and a plaintiff’s mere allegations
may be enough. See, e.g., Comet Enters. Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 860 (4th
Cir. 1997) (upholding a complaint against a motion to dismiss despite failing to plead
“that its claims are authorized by license” because even on a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff
need not come forward with all of the facts supporting its claim for relief”);; Atchinson v.
District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that under a notice
standard, complaints do “not [need] to state in detail the facts underlying a complaint”);;
Christine L. Childers, Note, Keep on Pleading: The Co-Existence of Notice Pleading and
the New Scope of Discovery Standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 36 VAL.
U. L. REV. 677, 686–87 (2002) (noting that after Conley, pleadings were no longer used to
develop the facts of a case).
8 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. See also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Our decision in
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions . . . .’” (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 1)).
9 See infra Part III (noting the multitude of standards on which district courts have
relied out of an uncertainty as to what the correct standard is to apply to an affirmative
defense).
10 Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, this was the standard required of affirmative
defenses. See, e.g., Davis v. Sun Oil Corp., 148 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 1998) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (“An affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be held to
be sufficient . . . ‘as long as it gives plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense.’”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1381 (3d ed. 2010))).
11 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
12 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 268
(D. Minn. 2009). This would be the standard that a judge would apply on a Rule 12(f)
motion to strike. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).
13 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
14 An insufficiently pled affirmative defense is subject to being stricken under Rule
12(f), which allows a plaintiff to move the court to strike an affirmative defense from the
pleadings and the case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an
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Part I will discuss how common law and code pleading gave
way to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Part II will trace
the Court’s interpretation of Rule 8 from Conley v. Gibson16 to the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions, as well as their effects on
complaints and affirmative defenses.17 Part III will examine the
standards that district courts are currently applying to
affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c) in light of Twombly and
Iqbal.18 Lastly, Part IV will propose how district courts should
assess affirmative defenses today, taking into account such
factors as the textual differences between Rule 8(a) and 8(c), the
policies behind the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, as well as the
overall fairness to a defendant and a plaintiff.19
I. FROM THE COMMON LAW TO THE CODES TO THE RULES
Pleading regimes in the United States are largely derived as
a reaction to the archaic and overly technical pleading standards
of the common law.20 At common law, the pleadings were used as
a mechanism to narrow the issues in dispute into one issue that
could be decided by a judge or a jury.21 Each cause of action had
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
The court may act . . . on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading
or, if a response is not allowed, within 20 days after being served with the pleading.”).
Thus, determining what exactly must be included in a responsive pleading by the
defendant is an important topic for both litigators and defendants.
15 See infra Part I (describing common law and code pleading standards).
16 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
17 See infra Part II (discussing the Twombly and Iqbal decisions).
18 See infra Part III (describing the different standards courts have adopted to assess
the sufficiency of affirmative defenses pled in the answer).
19 See infra Part IV (discussing that an approach requiring facts to be pled is not
only most fair to a defendant, but is most in line with the policies underlying the Twombly
and Iqbal decisions).
20 See Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), A Good Rulemaking, 69
TENN. L. REV. 97, 98 (2001) (noting that the Rules were a “reaction to arcane common law
pleading in England”);; Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in
the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly
and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1109 (2010) (“[N]otice pleading developed in
the 1930s as a reaction to arcane common law pleading rules and rigid code pleading.”).
As will be discussed, code pleading was meant to replace the “technical common law,” and
federal notice pleading was meant to replace “cumbersome” code pleading. Doug
Rendleman, Simplification—A Civil Procedure Perspective, 105 DICK. L. REV. 241, 243
(2001). See also John Hasnas, What’s Wrong With a Little Tort Reform?, 32 IDAHO L. REV.
557, 567 (1996) (describing code pleading as “arcane,” which is why it was replaced “in
favor of more liberalized notice pleading.”).
21 See Thomas P. Gressette, Jr., The Heightened Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: A New Phase in American Legal History Begins,
58 DRAKE L. REV. 401, 404 (2009) (“The . . . pleading scheme was premised on the
assumption that by proceeding through numerous stages of denial, avoidance, or
demurrer, a case eventually would be reduced to a single dispositive issue of fact or law.”
(quoting Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 554 (2002))).
See also ROY L. BROOKS, CRITICAL PROCEDURE 80 (Carolina Academic Press 1998) (“Issue
formulation was the centerpiece of common law pleading.”);; WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES
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its own separate pleading requirements.22 If the pleader failed to
plead the cause of action properly, the pleader had to start all
over again.23 Although there may have been benefits to such
single issue pleading,24 a pleading regime which “stake[s] the
outcome of litigation on the accuracy of a forecast that its merits
will properly turn on the resolution of a single issue specifically
HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 494 (New York University Press 1995)
(describing how pleading at common law required parties to plead back and forth until
one “precise issue” essential to the case was determined);; Clinton W. Francis, The
Structure of Judicial Administration and the Development of Contract Law in
Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 35, 56 (1983) (noting that at common
law, the pleadings were used as a mechanism to narrow the “litigation to a single issue”);
Howard T. Markey, Real-World Rules: Easing the Life of Litigation, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
421, 423 n.4 (1987–1988) (“At common law, pleadings served several purposes: giving
notice of the nature of the claim, stating the facts, narrowing the issues to be litigated,
and providing a means of quickly disposing of frivolous claims and meritless defenses.”).
22 See A.M. WILSHIRE, M.A., LL.B., PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON LAW 10 (Sweet &
Maxwell, Ltd. 1944). A party wishing to file a complaint (or a declaration as it was
known) had to follow the desired cause of action’s particular writ. See FLEMING JAMES, JR.
& GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 10–11 (Little, Brown and Co. 1977). Each
writ contained different requirements, which must be accurately pleaded or else the
pleader failed and would be unable to proceed further with the writ. See Koan Mercer,
“Even in These Days of Notice Pleadings”: Factual Pleading Requirements in the Fourth
Circuit, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2004) (“The common law pleading practice that
developed in England between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries required plaintiffs
to choose a single writ under which to bring their claims. Each writ triggered a different
form of action with distinct procedural, evidentiary, and jurisdictional requirements.”).
Much of the displeasure stemming from common law pleading was a result of the
technical requirements of these writs. See, e.g., Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin,
Proposed Changes to Discovery Rules in Aid of “Tort Reform”: Has the Case Been Made?,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1465, 1487 (1993) (“Common law pleading was prefigured and technical,
shaped by the twelfth-century system of writs and formalistic pleading requirements.”).
23 JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 22, at 11. Once a plaintiff and attorney decided on
the proper cause of action, a myriad of pleading exchanges with the defendant followed.
See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1986). Upon receiving the declaration, the
defendant could demur, that is, admit the factual allegations, but deny that any legal
basis existed for the claim, or plead to the declaration. See C. H. S. FIFOOT, M.A., ENGLISH
LAW AND ITS BACKGROUND 153 (WM. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1993). By doing this, if the
defendant raised a new fact not originally brought forth, the plaintiff would now have to
proceed as the defendant first did by admitting, denying, demurring, or pleading to it. See
HERBERT BROOM, M. A., COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW, DESIGNED AS
INTRODUCTORY TO ITS STUDY 177–78 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1997). This would proceed
anew if the plaintiff now raised a fact not raised by the declaration or by the defendant’s
response. Id. The pleadings would only cease if a fact raised by one is denied by the other,
or an issue of law is asserted by one, but denied by the other. Id. See also Thomas O.
Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 454–55
(2003) (“The system required an intricate network of highly technical rules designed to
aid or force the parties’ dispute to converge upon a single issue of law or fact.”).
24 For example, such single issue pleading allowed a lay juror easily to resolve the
main issue in the dispute, because instead of having to focus on multiple complex issues,
the juror was left with one single issue which one party asserted and the other denied. See
THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 413 (Little, Brown
and Co. 1956) (explaining that if the single issue left is one of fact, “then the parties will
have ascertained a material fact which one asserts and the other denies in terms so
precise that a jury will have no difficulty in hearing evidence on the matter and finding
the truth of it”).
OF THE
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designated in advance, will be bound to cause many a
miscarriage of justice.”25
To break from this approach, many states adopted code
pleading, which has its beginnings in the New York Code, known
distinctly as the “Field Code.”26 Code pleading required parties
to plead factual support for their claims or defenses,27 and
necessarily focused on using the pleadings as a mechanism in
which to develop facts.28 This assisted litigants greatly when it
came to discovery as each side already had the factual basis for
the other’s claims or defenses.29 Thus, code pleading, through
factual development, focused on narrowing the issues for
discovery and trial, without necessarily requiring that there be
only one issue of law or fact left, as was required at common
law.30
Although code pleading narrowed the scope of discovery,
oftentimes it was simply a difficult hurdle for litigators to
overcome.31 “[T]he pleader faced the problem of distinguishing
25 Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil
Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 981 (1998) (quoting Fleming James, Jr., The Objective and
Function of the Complaint: Common Law—Codes—Federal Rules, 14 VAND. L. REV. 899,
903 (1961)). For a discussion of the difficulties of common law pleading, see CHARLES M.
HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND
33 (2002) (describing pleading at common law as “a system of rigid formalism”).
26 See 4 B. E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, PLEADING § 1 (5th ed. 2008).
27 See Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden
Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1024, 1026 n.25 (1989) (“Code states
adopted the infamous requirement that pleaders set forth the ‘ultimate facts,’ rather than
‘conclusions of law’ or ‘evidentiary facts.’”).
28 See Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 100 (1994). See also Harry Emmanuel
Scozzaro, Jr., Note, Notice Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Following
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.: Standing on the Shoulders of Conley and Leatherman, 26
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 385, 411 (2002) (“Code pleading replaced the common law writ with
facts and the form of action with the cause of action.” (emphasis omitted)).
29 See Mark D. Robins, The Resurgence and Limits of the Demurrer, 27 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 637, 642 (1993). Thus, code pleading largely assisted parties in determining the
legitimacy of the other party’s claims or defenses. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 939 (1987) (describing the purpose of code pleading as redressing
the “legal rights subsisting between man and man in general”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
30 Amelia F. Burroughs, Comment, Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 75, 78 (2001–2002).
Compared with common law pleading, which was not as concerned with factual
development as it was with issue formulation, code pleading marked a significant break
from the common law. Molot, supra note 25, at 982–83 (explaining how at common law,
issue formulation did not also necessarily entail factual development).
31 See Tony L. Wilcox, Schmidt v. McIlroy Bank & Trust: An Old Twist to a New
Rule, 46 ARK. L. REV. 433, 437 (1993) (“The drafters of the code believed that code
pleading would allow the pleader more freedom in bringing his action and would rid the
court of the technical form and repetition of the common law system. Yet, even though
code pleading was much simpler, pleading problems persisted. While the rigid forms of
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facts from evidence and conclusions of law. Many statements fit
into both categories, and often it was impossible to make the
distinction.”32 In 1938, however, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were enacted and took a drastic turn from the
technical common law and the fact pleading requirements of the
code regimes.33
II. THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF FEDERAL PLEADING: FROM A
“NOTICE” STANDARD TO A “PLAUSIBILITY” STANDARD
At the heart of pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is Rule 8(a), which requires all complaints to contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”34 In Conley v. Gibson,35 the
Supreme Court interpreted Rule 8 to require that a complaint
“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.”36 Affirmative defenses, on the
action were abolished, there was no change in the substantive rights of the parties.”). See
also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990
(2003) (noting that code pleading, like common law pleading, concerned itself with
technicalities such as differentiating between facts and conclusions of law). A pleading
was insufficient if it merely pled conclusions, and was devoid of any factual basis. See
Wilcox, supra at 437–38 (explaining how under a code pleading regime, parties must only
plead facts). In an abundance of caution, parties often would plead too many facts in an
attempt to avoid a demurrer. Id. This “overpleading” led to high costs and delays and,
thus, instead of providing the actual factual support for a claim or defense, a party was
simply left with a myriad of facts, but little direction as to which actually applied. Id.
32 Wilcox, supra note 31, at 437.
Despite these concerns, twenty-eight states
currently maintain a code pleading system in one form or another. HEPBURN, supra note
25, at 92–113. Specifically, the states are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
33 See Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated any need to plead
facts in the complaint), amended by No. 94-1585, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 565 (7th Cir. Jan.
11, 1995). As code and common law pleading were often criticized for focusing on the
technical requirements of the pleadings, rather than the substantive merits of the claim,
the Rules were a notable response to these criticisms, and emphasized simple pleading
with broad and easy access to discovery, which is much more adept at uncovering the
facts and issues of a case. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 22, at 22 (noting that an
important function under the Rules is its “simplicity and liberal amendment in pleading
and motion practice”);; Morgan Cloud, The 2000 Amendments to the Federal Discovery
Rules and the Future of Adversarial Pretrial Litigation, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 27, 52 (2001)
(“One of the central reforms of the . . . Rules was to abandon the lengthy and technical
requirements of earlier common law and code pleading. Because the Rules’ drafters
believed that those forms of pleading had been a primary cause of litigation delay,
expense, inconvenience, and emphasized procedural games over the substantive merits of
the disputes, they embraced notice pleading, with its bare bones and easy to satisfy
requirements for stating a claim.”).
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
35 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
36 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
Furthermore, according to Conley, complaints are
sufficient “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
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other hand, are governed by Rule 8(c), which requires a
defendant to “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative
defense . . . .”37 Under the pre-Twombly standards, affirmative
defenses were held to the same Conley notice requirements as
was the complaint.38 Thus, raising an affirmative defense in the
answer was meant simply to provide the opposing party with
notice and allow that party to use the tools of discovery to further
develop the basis of the defense.39 Despite subsequent Supreme
Court decisions affirming this notice standard,40 in 2007, the
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 45–46. See also Walter W.
Heiser, A Critical Review of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 568 n.64 (1996) (noting that
Conley rejected a requirement that the pleadings contain all the necessary facts of the
claim or defense). The purpose of this lax standard was to allow parties an easy means of
access to discovery and thereby give the parties control over which facts and issues are
uncovered. See Sherman J. Clark, To Thine Own Self Be True: Enforcing Candor in
Pleading Through the Party Admissions Doctrine, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 565, 584 (1998)
(explaining that under the Conley notice standard, parties did not have to concern
themselves with setting forth facts and establishing their claims or defenses prior to
discovery). Thus, contrary to common law and code pleading concerns about narrowing
the issues for trial, federal pleading, prior to Twombly and Iqbal, was much more
concerned with preventing a party from forgoing a legitimate claim on the doubt that that
party lacked factual specificity at the time of filing the complaint. Id. Pleading under the
Rules was not meant to trap or trick a party, but was only meant to act as a means to
achieve an end to the litigation which was decided on the truth of the issues. See Maurice
Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 2197, 2207 (1989).
37 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
38 See Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Instituto
Nacional De Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Cont’l Il. Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 576
F. Supp. 985, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that affirmative defenses are “subject to the
general pleading requirements of Rules 8(a), 8(e) and 9(b), generally requiring only a
short and plain statement of the facts but demanding particularity as to the
circumstances constituting fraud and mistake”).
39 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 254 F.3d 173, 189 (D.C. Cir.
2001). See also FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 250 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining that Rule 8(c) is only meant to give the
plaintiff fair notice of the affirmative defense planned to be asserted at trial).
40 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (holding that, in
an employment discrimination suit brought “under a notice pleading system,” the facts
establishing plaintiff’s claim are not required to be pled); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding that a
heightened pleading requirement in a civil rights action is inconsistent “with the liberal
system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules”). For a discussion on the
relationship between Swierkiewicz, Leatherman, and Conley, see Scozzaro, supra note 28,
at 432 (“In light of Conley, Leatherman, and now Swierkiewicz, a full scale amending of
Rule 8 seems unlikely”). There are also a host of lower federal appellate courts affirming
and applying this notice standard. See, e.g., Miller v. Am. Heavy Lift Shipping, 231 F.3d
242, 247 (6th Cir. 2000) (“There can be no dispute that our modern rules of civil procedure
are based on the concept of ‘simplified notice pleading . . . .’” (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))
(internal quotations omitted)); C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding
that complaints only need to provide the defendant with “fair notice of . . . the plaintiff’s
claim . . . .” (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007))); Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that under the Rules, the opposing party is only required to be provided with
“notice of the claim or defense to be litigated . . . .” (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48,
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Supreme Court interpreted Rule 8 to require a plausibility
standard, not a notice requirement.41 In Twombly, while ruling
on the sufficiency of an antitrust complaint, the Court held that
“[t]he need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly
suggesting . . . agreement reflects Rule 8(a)(2)’s threshold
requirement that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to
‘show that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”42 The Court cited
concerns over the cost of litigation and reasoned that such a
heightened pleading requirement is necessary to prevent
excessive and unnecessarily expensive discovery in cases with no
“reasonably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal
relevant [information] . . . .”43
Following Twombly, there was uncertainty in lower federal
courts as to the exact standard to apply to all complaints, not
simply those involving an antitrust claim.44 Then, in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,45 the Court definitively closed the door on Conley, at least

abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))).
41 See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (describing Twombly’s and Iqbal’s
plausibility requirement).
42 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).
43 Id. at 559. This reasoning is a drastic departure from Conley, which concerned
itself not with controlling the scope of discovery, but with providing litigants with a
means to access discovery. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48 (holding that the ease of access
to discovery under the Rules is meant to provide parties with the ability to uncover the
factual basis for the other’s claims or defenses and it is because of this that the Rules
adopt notice pleading), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Thus, Conley and its progeny believed that the pleadings should not be used for factual
and issue development, but rather, that the litigants, with the tools of discovery, would do
this themselves. See Taylor v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 172, 180–81 (W.D.
Mo. 1984) (discussing that attorneys need the liberal discovery processes of the Rules “to
explore and develop facts to support established or reasonable extensions of established
legal theories”);; James E. Brown, Note, Civil Procedure—Standing and Direct Review in
Appellate Court—Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 1045, 1056 n.97 (1987)
(describing Conley’s intentions to use discovery, not pleadings, for factual development).
However, with the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, the complaint will now be used as a form
of factual development, in lieu of discovery. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (holding that a complaint must now contain some factual basis).
44 See, e.g., TalentBurst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 269–70 (D.
Mass. 2008) (applying Twombly to a tortious interference complaint); Dahl v. Bain Capital
Partners, L.L.C., 589 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that Twombly only
applies to “a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”). Considering some of the language
used in the Twombly decision, it is difficult to fault the courts for their uncertainty. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“In applying these general standards to a § 1 claim, we hold
that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true)
to suggest that an agreement was made.” (emphasis added));; Id. at 554–55 (“This case
presents the antecedent question of what a plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim
under § 1 of the Sherman Act.” (emphasis added)). See also Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks
of Twombly: Will We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 906–10
(2008) (discussing the problems that lower federal courts will have to grapple with in a
post-Twombly world).
45 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
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as applied to complaints.46 In Iqbal, the Court clarified that
“Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil
actions . . . .’”47 The Court further explained that Rule 8(a)
requires complaints to “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’”48 This is a two-part analysis, which first requires the court
to determine the statements that are factual support for the
complaint, which are treated as true, and the statements that are
merely conclusory allegations, which the court will not treat as
true.49 Having identified those statements that are afforded the
benefit of truth, the reviewing court must determine whether the
factual allegations state “a plausible claim for relief,” which will
require the “court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”50
Although the Court in Iqbal clarified that the
heightened pleading requirement of Twombly applies to all
complaints, the decision was silent as to whether this standard
applies to affirmative defenses.51
With this uncertainty,
defendants and lower federal courts have been left to determine
46 Id. at 1953 (holding that Twombly’s plausibility standard applies to all
complaints); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (holding that Conley’s notice standard did not set
forth the “minimum standard of adequate pleading” for complaints). As will be discussed
though, many courts are still adhering to Conley’s notice pleading standard when
assessing an affirmative defense. See infra Parts III(B)–(C)(i).
47 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
48 Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
49 Id. Although legal conclusions may be necessary to frame a complaint, “they must
be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 1950.
50 Id. Whatever precisely this plausibility standard will require of a district court
judge is an issue beyond the scope of this Comment. This Comment does not focus on
what the plausibility test actually means, but rather, what test should apply to an
affirmative defense. For a discussion of what the test does or should mean, see Charles B.
Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 29
(2008) (describing the plausibility standard as one that will necessarily fluctuate
depending on the type of case presented); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 20, at 1127
(arguing that a plausibility standard is not a concrete standard on which to assess a
complaint); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (2010)
(arguing that the plausibility standard is inconsistent with the Rules and prior Supreme
Court decisions); Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable:
Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 530 (2009) (“The plausibility standard is best understood as
an inferential standard unrelated to notice that is used to assess the substantive
sufficiency of a complaint.”).
51 See infra notes 144–45 and accompanying text (noting the lack of language in
Twombly and Iqbal that would indicate that those decisions were meant to apply to
affirmative defenses). See also Manuel John Dominguez, William B. Lewis & Anne F.
O’Berry, The Plausibility Standard as a Double-Edged Sword: The Application of
Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 84 FLA. B.J. 77, 77 (2010) (“Twombly’s
application to affirmative defenses has not been widely discussed.”);; Arthur R. Miller,
From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
60 DUKE L.J. 1, 101 (2010) (“Somewhat uncertain, however, are Twombly’s and Iqbal’s
applicability to denials and affirmative defenses.”);; Ryan Mize, From Plausibility to
Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1260–61 (2010) (noting that courts after Iqbal have to determine what
standard applies to affirmative defenses).
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what must be pled in an affirmative defense. Without clear
guidance though, the lower courts have split and are not
applying one clear uniform standard, thus leaving the
affirmative defense in a current state of disarray.52
III. IN LIGHT OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL, DISTRICT COURTS ARE
APPLYING A MULTITUDE OF STANDARDS TO AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES
Although over sixty district courts have ruled on the
applicability of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses,53 as of
this publication, no Court of Appeals has directly ruled on the
issue.54 District courts, however, have developed a multitude of
standards to assess an affirmative defense in light of Twombly
and Iqbal.55 Due to this lack of uniformity, the majority of courts
do not apply the plausibility standard. Rather, the courts’
decisions can be parsed into one of the following categories: (1)
district courts which apply Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility and
fact pleading requirements;56 (2) district courts which reject
Twombly and Iqbal because Rule 8(a) and 8(c) do not have
52 Despite the uncertain state of the affirmative defense, there is little scholarly
work on the issue. Two articles argue for the extension of the plausibility standard to
affirmative defenses. See Melanie A. Goff & Richard A. Bales, A “Plausible” Defense:
Applying Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
(forthcoming
Spring
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1846918; Joseph Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the Complaint, 53
WM & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1721062. One article argues that the plausibility standard
should not be extended to affirmative defenses. See Anthony Gambol, The Twombly
Standard and Affirmative Defenses: What is Good for the Goose is Not Good for the
Gander, 79 FORD. L. REV. 2173, 2205 (2011). However, Gambol differs from this
Comment as Gambol argues that the affirmative defense standard should not be modified
at all, and should remain as the Conley notice standard. This Comment, however, argues
that such a standard is unfair to the plaintiff, and thus, the affirmative defense pleading
standard must be modified.
53 See infra Part III (describing the different approaches courts have taken in
assessing the sufficiency of an affirmative defense pled in an answer).
54 See Falley v. Friends Univ., No. 10-1423-CM, 2011 WL 1429956, at *1 (D. Kan.
Apr. 14, 2011) (noting that no appellate court has decided the issue of whether the
pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses); FTC v. Hope
Now Modifications, LLC, No. 09-1204, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 24657, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 10,
2011) (“[T]he Court’s research confirms, that no Federal Circuit Court has yet considered
whether to extend the pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative
defenses.”);; Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., No. 5:10-CV-66-F, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS
107105, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2010) (“Neither the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, nor
any other circuit court of appeals, has addressed whether Twombly and Iqbal should be
interpreted as applying to affirmative defenses.”); Del-Nat Tire Corp. v. A To Z Tire &
Battery, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02457-JPM-tmp., 2009 WL 4884435, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 8,
2009) (“Neither the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals nor any of the other Court of Appeals
have addressed this issue . . . .”).
55 See infra Part III.
56 See infra Part III(A) (describing various courts’ applications of the plausibility
standard to affirmative defenses).

Do Not Delete

2011]

12/17/2011 11:47 AM

Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 8(c)

387

identical language;57 and (3) district courts which do not
explicitly accept or reject Twombly and Iqbal, but rather adopt a
standard inconsistent with those decisions.58
A. District Courts That Explicitly Adopt Twombly and Iqbal
Are Holding Affirmative Defenses to a Plausibility Standard
A number of district courts interpreted Twombly and Iqbal
as announcing a universal pleading standard and, thus, apply
the two-part plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.
In Grovernor House, L.L.C., v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and
Co.,59 the plaintiff filed a motion to strike an affirmative defense
pled by the defendant which simply alleged: “[Plaintiff] assumed
the risk associated with the design of the canopy.”60 In holding
that Twombly’s and Iqbal’s plausibility standard applies to
affirmative defenses, the court reasoned that affirmative
defenses, like complaints, are subject to Rule 8(a) and its
pleading requirements.61 Thus, the court was adopting the
reasoning of pre-Twombly courts that affirmative defenses and
complaints are subject to the same requirements,62 despite the
fact that different rules govern each pleading.63 In assessing the
particular affirmative defense at issue in this case, the court
granted the motion to strike because the defense was a “bare
legal conclusion.”64 By failing to plead any facts, the pleading
failed “to suggest that a defense is plausible on its face.”65
57 See infra Part III(B) (describing how certain courts have rejected the Twombly
and Iqbal requirements as the Rules do not set forth the same standard for an affirmative
defense as they do for a complaint).
58 See infra Part III(C). This category can be further sub-divided into courts which
adopt: (i) a notice pleading standard; (ii) a fact pleading standard; or (iii) a standard
which makes the factual particularity required depend on the defense pled. For a
discussion arguing that the majority of district courts are adopting a plausibility
standard, while a minority are rejecting the plausibility standard, or applying a hybrid of
both, see Dominguez et al., supra note 51, at 77.
59 Grovernor House, L.L.C., v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., No. 09-21698-CivCOOKE/BANDSTRA, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 91905 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2010).
60 Id. at *11.
61 Id. at *4.
62 See Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999).
63 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief . . . .”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .” (emphasis added)).
64 Grovernor House, L.L.C., 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 91905 at *11.
65 Id. at *12. This is certainly a Twombly and Iqbal analysis as it required the court
to “draw on its judicial experience and common sense” in making its plausibility
determination. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). Furthermore, this
analysis mirrors one that a judge would perform on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a
complaint. See, e.g., Wilson v. Price, 624 F.3d 389, 391–92 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that
when faced with a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if the complaint does not state a plausible
claim for relief, “the plaintiff pleads itself out of court” (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich,
526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008))); Hinton v. Dennis, 362 F. App’x 904, 906 (10th Cir.
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Furthermore, in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. O’Hara
Corp.,66 the court expounded on some of the policy reasons behind
adopting the Twombly and Iqbal requirements for affirmative
defenses.67 In applying the Twombly and Iqbal standard,68 the
court reasoned that by simply allowing the defendant to list any
affirmative defense without providing factual support, the
defendant was creating “unnecessary work” for the court and the
plaintiff.69 As such defenses require discovery, allowing any legal
conclusion to be sufficient will require every plaintiff to
determine “which defenses are truly at issue and which are
merely asserted without factual basis but in an abundance of
caution.”70
Perhaps the most illustrative example of this concern over
discovery issues occurred in the following decision. In Palmer v.
Oakland Farms, Inc.,71 the defendant pled eighteen affirmative
defenses, and the court struck eleven for being conclusory.72 In
applying the Twombly and Iqbal rule, the court reasoned that
discovery should not be used to determine the legitimacy of a
defense, but instead should be used to uncover additional facts
supporting the defense.73
A number of cases expressed unease in having separate
pleading standards for plaintiffs and defendants as it would not
only be unfair, but would make it difficult for the court to
determine the sufficiency of an affirmative defense on a motion to
strike.74 In Castillo v. Roche Laboratories, Inc.,75 the court struck
2010) (holding that when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must
contain “specific factual allegations that support a plausible legal claim for relief”);; Kay v.
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that when faced with a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “specific allegations” supporting a
plausible claim for relief (quoting Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th
Cir. 2007))), appeal dismissed, 500 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007); Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C.
v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he mere metaphysical possibility
that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is
insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a
reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.”).
66 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 2558015 (E.D.
Mich. June 25, 2008).
67 Id. at *1.
68 Id. (affirmative defense “must state ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007))).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179 (W.D. Va.
June 24, 2010).
72 Id. at *1, *6.
73 Id. at *5. Furthermore, in Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained
Program, the defendant pled twenty-four affirmative defenses consisting largely of
“conclusory statements.” 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The court held
these to the Twombly and Iqbal standard and struck thirteen of them. Id. at 1173.
74 See United States v. Quadrini, No. 2:07-CV-132227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *4 (E.D.

Do Not Delete

2011]

12/17/2011 11:47 AM

Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 8(c)

389

the defendant’s affirmative defense for failing to meet the
plausibility requirements of Twombly and Iqbal.76 One defense
simply stated: “Plaintiff’s [c]omplaint fails, in whole or in part, to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted,”77 and was
struck for being a “bare-bones, conclusory statement[] without
any factual allegations.”78 The court dismissed the argument
that it is unfair to hold a defendant, who has only days to
answer, to the same standard as a plaintiff, who may have
prepared his or her case for years.79 As “boilerplate defenses . . .
require significant unnecessary discovery,”80 the court has to hold
a high amount of pretrial conferences and respond to ill-founded
summary judgment motions.81 With a basis of the underlying
facts needed to support the affirmative defenses, the court has
much greater control over the discovery process.82

Mich. Dec. 6, 2007). See also Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 234
(E.D.N.C. 2010) (“‘[T]he considerations of fairness, common sense and litigation efficiency’
underlying Twombly and Iqbal’ mandate that the same pleading requirements apply
equally to complaints and affirmative defenses.” (quoting Francisco v. Verizon S. Inc., No.
3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 77083, at *7 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010))); Topline
Solutions, Inc. v. Sandler Sys., Inc., No. L-09-3102, 2010 WL 2998836, at *1 (D. Md. July
27, 2010) (“[I]t would be incongruous and unfair to require a plaintiff to operate under one
standard and to permit the defendant to operate under a different, less stringent
standard.”);; Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 2009) (“It
makes no sense to find that a heightened pleading standard applies to claims but not to
affirmative defenses.”).
75 Castillo v. Roche Labs., No. 10-20876-CIV, 2010 WL 3027726 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2,
2010).
76 Id. at *1.
77 Id.
78 Id. at *3 (emphasis omitted).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. For courts employing similar reasoning, see HCRI TRS Acquirer, L.L.C. v.
Iwer, III, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“Boilerplate affirmative defenses
that provide little or no factual support can have the same detrimental effect on the cost
of litigation as poorly worded complaints.”);; Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737,
2010 WL 2990159, at *7 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) (“An even-handed standard as related to
pleadings ensures that the affirmative defenses supply enough information to explain the
parameters of and basis for an affirmative defense such that the adverse party can
reasonably tailor discovery.”);; Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, L.L.C., 725 F. Supp. 2d 532,
536 (D. Md. 2010) (“The application of the Twombly and Iqbal standard to defenses
will . . . discourage defendants from asserting boilerplate affirmative defenses that are
based upon nothing more than ‘some conjecture that [they] may somehow apply.’”
(quoting Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (2009))); Carretta v. May
Trucking Co., No. 09-158-MJR, 2010 WL 1139099, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2010) (holding
that affirmative defenses “must be ‘plausible,’ raising ‘a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence’ supporting the allegations” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007))); Burget v. Capital W. Sec., Inc., No. CIV-09-1015-M,
2009 WL 4807619, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2009) (“An even-handed standard as related
to pleadings ensures that the affirmative defenses supply enough information to explain
the parameters of and basis for an affirmative defense such that the adverse party can
reasonably tailor discovery.”).
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The courts adopting this standard are focused on judicial
economy through narrowing the scope of discovery at the
pleading phase.83 This clearly mirrors the Court’s concerns in
Twombly and Iqbal as applied to a plaintiff, because to have to
sort through a host of affirmative defenses to determine which
actually have validity is costly and burdensome to a plaintiff.84
83 Instead of allowing parties to simply list affirmative defenses, as was allowed
prior to Twombly, these decisions in an effort to narrow the scope of discovery are
requiring enough factual support to state a plausible affirmative defense. See, e.g.,
Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16,
2009) (noting that “in some cases, merely pleading the name of the affirmative defense . . .
may be sufficient”). However, as will be discussed, this standard has not been uniformly
accepted.
84 See Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5
(W.D. Va. June 24, 2010) (“[A] plaintiff [should] not be left to the formal discovery process
to find-out whether the defense exists [but should], instead, use the discovery process for
its intended purpose of ascertaining the additional facts which support a well-pleaded
claim or defense.”). In addition to Palmer, for additional district court decisions which
hold that Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses, see Groupon Inc. v. MobGob
L.L.C., No. 10 C 7456, 2011 WL 2111986, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2011) (“[D]espite
potentially valid policy arguments for holding affirmative defenses to a lower pleading
standard than complaints . . . the Court must apply the same standards, including those
expressed recently by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . .”
(citations omitted)); Sanders v. Cont’l Collection Agency, Ltd., No. 11-cv-00448-CMAMJW, 2011 WL 1706911, at *1 (D. Co. May 5, 2011) (holding that Iqbal and Twombly
apply to affirmative defenses); Shaw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, No. 10-03355-CVW-DGK, 2011 WL 1050004, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2011) (holding Iqbal and Twombly
apply to affirmative defenses); United States S.E.C. v. Sachdeva, No. 10-C-747, 2011 WL
933967, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2011) (holding Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative
defenses); Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC, No. 4:10-cv-00582-DGK, 2011 WL 1364075
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2011) (holding that Iqbal’s and Twombly’s plausibility standard
applies to affirmative defenses); School of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Greatest Generations
Found., No. 10-3499-CV-S-ODS, 2011 WL 1337406, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 7, 2011)
(applying the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses); U.S. v. Brink, No. C-10-243,
2011 WL 835828, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2011) (holding that Twombly and Iqbal apply to
affirmative defenses); Burns v. Dodeka, L.L.C., No. 4:09-CV-19-BJ, 2010 WL 1903987, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2010) (striking affirmative defenses that “are wholly conclusory and
fail to plead any facts that demonstrate the plausibility of such defenses as required by
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly . . . ”);; OSF Healthcare Sys. v. Banno, No. 08-1096, 2010
WL 431963, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2010) (holding that Twombly and Iqbal “dealt with
whether a complaint’s allegations satisfied pleading requirements, but their statements
seem equally applicable to affirmative defenses, given that affirmative defenses are
subject to those same pleading requirements”);; AET Rail Grp., L.L.C. v. Siemens Transp.
Sys., Inc., No. 08-CV-6442, 2009 WL 5216960, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (“Twombly
does not require that the complaint (or here, the Answer with affirmative defenses)
provide ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . however, it must ‘amplify a claim with some
factual allegations . . . to render the claim plausible.’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007),
rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009))); Premium Standard Farms,
L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Co. of Am., No. 09-0699-CV-W-GAF, 2009 WL 4907063,
at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 14, 2009) (holding defendant “has stated plausible affirmative
defenses . . . ”);; Bank of Montreal v. SK Foods, L.L.C., No. 09 C 3479, 2009 WL 3824668,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2009) (striking affirmative defenses for being implausible); Tracy
v. NVR, Inc., No. 04-CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (“[T]he
Twombly plausibility standard applies with equal force to a motion to strike an
affirmative defense under Rule 12(f).”);; In re Mission Bay Ski & Bike, Inc., Nos. 07 B
20870, 08 A 55, 2009 WL 2913438, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009) (“Affirmative
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B. District Courts That Explicitly Reject Twombly’s and Iqbal’s
Plausibility Standard Are Applying Conley’s Notice Pleading
Standard
Focusing on the textual differences between Rule 8(a) and
Rule 8(c), the following decisions explicitly rejected the Twombly
and Iqbal standard.
In FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, the court rejected an
argument that an affirmative defense must be pled with
plausible support because “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
distinguish the level of pleading required between a plaintiff
asserting a claim for relief under Rule 8(a) and a defendant
asserting an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c).”85 When a
defendant pleads an affirmative defense, the defendant does not
seek a “claim for relief” within Rule 8(a).86 Thus, the simple Rule
8(c) standard should apply, and a defendant need only “state” the
affirmative defense.87
In McLemore v. Regions Bank,88 the court allowed an
affirmative defense to stand despite the fact that it only stated
that: “Plaintiffs’ fault is comparatively greater than any fault of
[defendant’s].”89 The court held that the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions did not affect the pleading standard for affirmative
defenses.90 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court in
Twombly and Iqbal was not interpreting Rule 8(c), but rather
was only interpreting Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a complaint
be stated with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”91 Although Rule 8(b) and
Rule 8(a) both require an answer or a complaint to be stated in
“short and plain terms,” Rule 8(c) is the applicable standard
defenses are pleadings and so are subject to all pleading requirements under the Federal
Rules. . . . [Thus,] [t]he facts alleged must be sufficient not only to give notice of the
nature of the claim but to show the claim ‘is plausible on its face.’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009)));; Magicon, L.L.C. v. Weatherford Int’l, Inc., Nos. 4:08-cv-03639, 4:08-cv-03636,
2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 126500, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009) (holding affirmative
defenses “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true” to state a plausible
defense); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Mal Corp., No. 07 C 2034, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS
23540, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2009) (“[A]n affirmative defense need only articulate ‘a
plausible set of underlying facts.’” (quoting SEG Liquidation Co., L.L.C. v. Stevenson, No.
07 C 3456, 2008 WL 623626, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2008))).
85 FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, L.L.C., No. 09-1204 (JBS/JS), 2011 WL 883202,
at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011).
86 Id.
87 Id. at *2.
88 McLemore v. Regions Bank, Nos. 3:08-cv-0021, 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 WL 1010092
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010).
89 Id. at *12.
90 Id. at *13.
91 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007))).
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when assessing an affirmative defense, not Rule 8(b).92 Thus, the
above-pled affirmative defense was sufficient because it only
needs to be pled in “‘general terms.’”93
Furthermore, in Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A.,94 the court upheld an affirmative defense, which only
alleged that “Plaintiffs’ claims are barred in whole or in part by
Plaintiffs’ contributory and/or comparative negligence.”95 As in
McLemore, the court reasoned that Twombly was interpreting
the word “showing” in Rule 8(a), and under Rule 8(c) the
defendant does not have to “show” anything.96 Thus, the
plausibility standard does not apply to a defendant’s affirmative
defenses pled under Rule 8(c).97
A number of courts were troubled by the inherent unfairness
in requiring a defendant to plead enough facts to prove an
affirmative defense plausible on its face.98 Specifically, in
Holdbrook v. SAIA Motor Freight Line, L.L.C.,99 the court upheld
an affirmative defense which merely alleged: “Plaintiff has been
the cause of his own damages . . . .”100 The court reasoned that
affirmative defenses are not held to a heightened pleading
standard as it is entirely reasonable to hold a plaintiff who may
92 Id. This decision is focusing not on the underlying policies of the Twombly and
Iqbal decisions, but rather on a simple textual analysis of the Rules. Strictly speaking,
the court is correct in this regard as the text of Rule 8(a) and 8(c) clearly differ. Compare
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”), with
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any
avoidance or affirmative defense.” (emphasis added)). In applying the same pre-Twombly
standard to affirmative defenses though, the court is taking an approach inconsistent
with the new direction of the Supreme Court. As will be discussed further below, this
Comment’s proposed standard takes into account the textual differences between Rule
8(a) and 8(c), as well as the underlying policies of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. In so
doing, the correct medium is attained, and the concerns of these district court decisions
and those of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions are effectively harmonized.
93 McLemore, 2010 WL 1010092, at *13 (quoting Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 F. App’x
442, 456 (6th Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2008)).
94 Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A, No. 01-119, 2009 WL 4981730, at *4
(D. Va. Dec. 8, 2009).
95 Id. at *6.
96 Id. at *4. Similarly, in Henson v. Supplemental Health Care Staffing Specialists,
the court upheld an affirmative defense which only alleged: “[t]he doctrines of waiver
and/or estoppel preclude the Plaintiff’s right to recover in whole or in part.” No. CIV-090397-HE, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 127642, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 30, 2009). When the
complaint and the defense are examined together, the defense provides the plaintiff with
enough to be informed “of the nature of the defense . . . .” Id. at *4.
97 Chase Manhattan Bank, 2009 WL 4981730, at *4. See also Romantine v. CH2M
Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) (“This court
does not believe that Twombly is appropriately applied to either affirmative defenses
under 8(c), or general defenses under Rule 8(b) . . . .”).
98 See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
99 Holdbrook v. SAIA Motor Freight Line, L.L.C., No. 09-cv-02870-LTB-BNB, 2010
WL 865380 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2010).
100 Id. at *1.
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have years to investigate his or her claims to a higher standard
than a defendant who has only twenty-one days to respond to the
complaint.101
Thus, these decisions explicitly rejected the policy rationales
underlying the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.102 Instead, they
focused on the textual differences between Rule 8(a) and 8(c), as
well as fairness concerns, and held that the plausibility standard
is not applicable to affirmative defenses.103
101 Id. at *2. Consider also, the court in Baum v. Faith Technologies, which held that
it is unfair to “expect defendants to be aware of all the necessary facts” required to make
up an affirmative defense, as the defendant has not yet had an opportunity to conduct
discovery. No.10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010).
Besides, when taken together, a complaint and an answer provide a plaintiff with
sufficient notice of the defense. Id. Thus, a court should look at both the answer and the
complaint because “[i]t would be absurd to require a defendant to re-plead every fact
relevant to an affirmative defense.” Id.
102 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
103 Thus, at least to these decisions, Conley is not entirely irrelevant as a pleading
standard; rather, it only applies to an affirmative defense. Therefore, Conley is truly not
“bad law” as these decisions are clearly adopting this standard. If Conley is to somehow
remain applicable after the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, it would most likely have to be
through an affirmative defense. For additional decisions which reject the plausibility
standard, see Bowers v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, No. 10–4141–JTM–
DJW, 2011 WL 2149423, at *4 (D. Kan. June 1, 2011) (holding that affirmative defenses
“are not subject to the rationale and holdings of Iqbal and Twombly.”);; Schlief v. NuSource, Inc., No. 10-4477 (DWF/SER), 2011 WL 1560672, at *9 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2011)
(“The Court concludes that the pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal does not
apply to affirmative defenses.”);; Falley v. Friends University, No. 10-1423-CM, 2011 WL
1429956, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2011) (“[T]he pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal
should be limited to complaints—not extended to affirmative defenses.”);; Tyco Fire
Products LP v. Victaulic Co., No.10-4645, 2011 WL 1399847, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2011)
(“Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to affirmative defenses.”);; In re Washington Mutual,
Inc. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, No. 08-md-1919 MJP, 2011 WL 1158387,
at *1 (W.D. Wa. Mar. 25, 2011) (holding Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to affirmative
defenses);; Jeeper’s of Auburn, Inc. v. KWJB Enterprise, L.L.C., No. 10-13682, 2011 WL
1899195, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2011) (holding that since Iqbal and Twombly do not
expressly apply to affirmative defenses, then they should not be extended as such); Sewell
v. Allied Interstate, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-113, 2011 WL 32209, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2011)
(holding that since Twombly and Iqbal do not expressly apply to affirmative defenses,
then they should not be extended as such); Ameristar Fence Products., Inc. v. Phoenix
Fence Co., No.CV-10-299-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 2803907, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010)
(“[T]he pleading standards enunciated in Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . have no
application to affirmative defenses pled under Rule 8(c).”);; Jackson v. City of Centreville,
269 F.R.D. 661, 662 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (“The Supreme Court desired to prevent plaintiffs
with groundless claims from wasting judicial and other legal resources . . . . Neither
Twombly nor Iqbal address Rules 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(c) which pertain to affirmative
defenses.” (citations omitted));; First National Insurance Co. of America v. Camps
Services, Ltd., No.08-cv-12805, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 149, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009)
(“Twombly’s analysis of the ‘short and plain statement’ requirement of Rule 8(a) is
inapplicable to this motion under Rule 8(c).”);; Westbrook v. Paragon Systems, Inc., No. 070714-WS-C, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 88490, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007) (“Twombly was
decided under Rule 8(a), . . . and plaintiff has identified no case extending it to Rule 8(b)
or (c).” (citation omitted)). In addition to the above, a number of decisions implicitly
rejected Twombly’s and Iqbal’s pleading requirements. See Chatelaine, Inc. v. Twin
Modal, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-676, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 89348, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27,
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C. District Courts That Do Not Explicitly Adopt or Reject
Twombly and Iqbal Are Applying Standards Inconsistent with
Those Decisions
A number of district courts have explicitly neglected to
decide the Twombly and Iqbal issue, but rather simply adopt a
different standard or revert to Conley’s notice standard. Thus,
these decisions, although not explicit, are rejecting the Twombly
and Iqbal rule as they are applying standards inconsistent with
the plausibility test.
i. District Courts That Apply a Notice Pleading Standard
These decisions simply cite Twombly or Iqbal and then
conclude that the proper standard is one of only providing the
plaintiff with “fair notice” of the defense, not of providing the
plaintiff with any factual basis for the defense.104
In BJ Energy, L.L.C. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,105 the
court declined to strike an affirmative defense which simply
stated: “[Plaintiff] has failed to mitigate any damages it purports
to have suffered.”106 Despite failing to allege any factual basis for
why or how the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages, “fair notice
of the nature of the defense” is all that is required as the
discovery process, not the pleadings, are the proper mechanism
in which to uncover the factual basis for the defenses.107 This is
2010) (holding affirmative defenses were sufficiently pled and that “any facts supporting
these [affirmative defenses] can and should be fleshed out through discovery”);; Pezzuto v.
Premier Hosp. Mgmt., Inc., No. 10-CV-068-JHP, 2010 WL 2788163, at *1 (E.D. Okla. July
14, 2010) (holding that affirmative defenses should be read in conjunction with the
complaint because “an answer . . . will contain fewer factual assertions than a complaint
and still be sufficient”);; Kaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co., No.09-10239-RGS, 2009 WL
2449872, at *1 n.1 (D. Ma. Aug. 6, 2009) (holding that Rule 8(c)(1) defenses need only be
pled as listed because the “plaintiff, as the instigator of the litigation, has the initial good
faith burden to investigate and verify the validity of her claims”).
104 See, e.g., Local 165 v. DEM/EX Grp. Inc., No. 09-1356, 2010 WL 971811, at *2
(C.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2010) (“[T]here must be enough to give the opposing party notice of the
basis for the claim or defense.” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007))).
105 BJ Energy, L.L.C. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Nos. 08-3649, 09-2864, 2010
WL 1491900 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2010).
106 Id. at *4.
107 Id. at *2, *5. A true Twombly and Iqbal analysis would most certainly have struck
this. For starters, there are literally no factual allegations in the defense. See Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). A plaintiff trying to focus the scope of
discovery would have to broadly determine the defendant’s reasons, if any, for asserting
the defense. This would require ascertaining what the defendant thinks, which
necessarily can be a wide range of topics. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No
Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685 (1998) (“Since discovery extends under Rule 26
to anything ‘relevant to the subject matter,’ relevance must be ascertained by some other
mechanism. The only effective alternative is discovery itself.”). This will only protract
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clearly antithetical to Twombly’s and Iqbal’s intentions of
denying a party access to discovery by merely pleading legal
conclusions, which may provide notice of the claim, but are
devoid of any factual basis.108 Thus, this decision and others
cited, revert to notice pleading, a much lower bar for a defendant
to surpass, which accomplishes little in reducing the costs of
discovery.109

litigation and add to its costs. See Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute
Resolution in the Card Context: Structure, Reputation, and Incentives, 1 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 393, 403 (2005) (explaining that under a notice pleading regime limitations on the
parties’ abilities to conduct lengthy discovery is not very limited as the parties must
attempt to determine what can be relevant to the vaguely stated claim or defense); Ettie
Ward, Will the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Improve the
Pretrial Process?, 72 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 18, 24 (2000) (discussing the effect of depositions on
discovery costs); Michael G. Dailey, Comment, Preemption of State Court Class Action
Claims for Securities Fraud: Should Federal Law Trump?, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 595
(1998–1999) (explaining how the expensive costs of discovery can cause a defendant to
settle instead of attempting to bear these costs).
108 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for
a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”);; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases before even reaching [pretrial] proceedings.”). For
the remaining decisions which apply this standard, see Local 165 v. DEM/EX Grp. Inc.,
No. 09-1356, 2010 WL 971811, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2010) (“[T]here must be enough to
give the opposing party notice of the basis for the claim or defense.” (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555)); Tara Prods., Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets, Inc., No. 09-61436-CIVCOHN/SELTZER, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 121709, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2009)
(“Although Rule 8 does not obligate a defendant to set forth detailed factual allegations, a
defendant must give the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the defense and the grounds
upon which it rests.”);; Darnell v. Hoelscher, Inc., No. 09-204-JPG, 2009 WL 4675884, at
*1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2009) (“[T]he [defense] need only give fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); CTF Dev., Inc.
v. Penta Hospitality, L.L.C., No. C 09-02429 WHA, 2009 WL 3517617, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 26, 2009) (holding that Iqbal only requires the defendant to provide the plaintiff with
“fair notice” of the affirmative defense);; FDIC v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, L.L.C., No.
08-81536-CIV, 2009 WL 2488302, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009) (“Although Rule 8 does
not obligate a defendant to set forth detailed factual allegations, a defendant must give
the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the defense and the grounds upon which it
rests.”);; New York v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. C 06-6436, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1624, at
*12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009) (“The ‘fair notice’ pleading requirement is met if the
defendant ‘sufficiently articulated the defense so that the plaintiff was not a victim of
unfair surprise.’” (quoting Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999)));
Greenheck Fan Corp. v. Loren Cook Co., No. 08-cv-335-jps, 2008 WL 4443805, at *1 (W.D.
Wis. Sept. 25, 2008) (“The issue is . . . whether [the] plaintiff has been placed on notice of
defendant’s grounds for raising the defense.”).
109 See Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1794, 1804 (2002) (discussing how discovery under notice pleading “can entail pretrial
practice out of any sensible relationship to the stakes or needs of relatively simple
litigation”);; Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 639 (1989)
(describing how notice pleading often entails discovery costs which are ultimately
irrelevant to the merits of the case); Michael F. Urbanski & James R. Creekmore,
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 973, 986 (1998) (discussing how
discovery under a notice regime “can often be extensive, expensive and burdensome”
(quoting DEE-K Enterprises, Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1150 (E.D. Va.
1997)).
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ii. District Courts That Require an Adequate Factual Basis
or Factual Particularity to Be Pled Are Not Adopting the
Plausibility Standard
These decisions were fractured from Part III(A) because the
cases in this category do not apply both the factual and
plausibility elements of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.110
Rather, these cases require facts to be pled, but not necessarily
enough to give rise to a defense “that is plausible on its face.”111
Notably, in Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.,112 the court held
that nine of the defendant’s seventeen affirmative defenses pled
“insufficient allegations of fact.”113 Citing Twombly, the court
reasoned that factual support must be pled in an affirmative
defense because a plaintiff should not simply have to guess as to
what the basis is for the defendant’s assertions.114 However, the
court stopped short of requiring the defense to be plausible, but
rather only required that factual support be provided.115
Thus, this decision and others cited were not assessing the
sufficiency of factual support provided under a plausibility
standard, but were simply assessing whether or not any facts
were pled.116
110 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
111 Id. See also infra notes 112–12 and accompanying text.
112 Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc, No. 07-80551-CIV, 2008 WL 2225668 (S.D. Fla.
May 29, 2008).
113 Id. at *2.
114 Id. (quoting Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F. Supp. 790, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
115 Id.
116 Therefore, this did not encompass the two part plausibility requirement, but
rather only required some factual basis. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009). For the remaining decisions applying this standard, see Luvata Buffalo, Inc. v.
Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada, No. 08-CV-00034(A)(M), 2010 WL 826583, at
*8 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2010) (“Affirmative defenses which amount to nothing more than
mere conclusions of law and are not warranted by any asserted facts have no efficacy.”
(quoting Shechter v. Comptroller of N.Y.C., 79 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 1996))); Cosmetic
Warriors, Ltd. v. Lush Boutique, L.L.C., No. 09-6381, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16392, at *4
(E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2010) (“[A] defendant must plead an affirmative defense with . . . factual
particularity.”);; IndyMac Venture, L.L.C. v. Silver Creek Crossing, L.L.C., C09-1069Z,
2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 34275, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 18, 2010) (“Courts have stricken
defenses that were unsupported by facts entitling defendants to relief . . . and when
defenses rely on facts that, even if true, would not provide a valid defense to the claims
asserted” (citations omitted));; EEOC v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D 260, 268 (D.
Minn. 2009) (“[T]he defendant [must] plead an adequate factual basis for affirmative
defenses, where the basis is not apparent by the defense’s bare assertion.”);; Solis v. Zenith
Capital, L.L.C., No. C 08-4854 PJH, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 43350, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 8,
2009) (“Where an affirmative defense simply states a legal conclusion or theory without
the support of facts explaining how it connects to the instant case, it is insufficient and
will not withstand a motion to strike.”);; Stoffels v. SBC Communications, No. 05-CV-0233WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) (holding that affirmative
defenses must “provide the grounds for entitlement to relief and requires ‘more than
labels and conclusions’” and must be pled with “factual particularity” (quoting Bell Atl.

Do Not Delete

2011]

12/17/2011 11:47 AM

Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 8(c)

397

iii.
One District Court Applied Both the Plausibility
Standard and the Fair Notice Standard to Affirmative
Defenses
The parties in Voeks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,117 debated over
whether the Twombly standard should apply or if the fair notice
standard outlined in Woodfield v. Bowman should apply.118 The
court held that in fact both should apply because “Twombly and
Woodfield are not materially different.”119 The proper test is not
that “specific facts are [] necessary; [but, that] the statement
need only ‘give . . . fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.”120 The amount and specificity of
facts which are required to be pled turn on the defense pled, and
the specific case in which it is pled.121 Although this decision was
not adopting a plausibility standard,122 it did require the answer
at least to provide the grounds on which the defense rests, which
may include certain facts depending on the particular defense
pled.123
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))); Home Mgmt. Solutions, Inc. v. Prescient,
Inc., No. 07-20608-CIV, 2007 WL 2412834, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2007) (holding that
because “a defendant must . . . plead an affirmative defense with enough specificity or
factual support to give the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the defense,” by failing to plead the
elements of the defense or any facts to support those elements, the defendant failed to
provide the plaintiff with fair notice).
117 Voeks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-C-0030, 2008 WL 89434 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 7,
2008).
118 Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a defendant
“must plead an affirmative defense with enough specificity or factual particularity to give
the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the defense that is being advanced”).
119 Voeks, 2008 WL 89434, at *6.
120 Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))).
121 Id. The court upheld a statute of limitations defense because although “not pled
with much detail,” it is essentially “self-explanatory.” Id.
122 Id. (“Twombly and Woodfield are not materially different”).
The court also
required the elements of equitable defenses to be pled. Id. Other courts take a similar
approach to equitable defenses. See, e.g., Bartashnik v. Bridgeview Bancorp, Inc., No. 05
C 2731, 2005 WL 3470315, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2005) (“[E]quitable defenses . . . must
be pled with the specific elements required to establish the defense.” (quoting Yash Raj
Films Inc. v. Atl. Video, No. 03 C 7069, 2004 WL 1200184, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2004))).
123 Voeks, 2008 WL 89434, at *6. There were also a number of decisions that applied
a “cannot succeed under any circumstances test.” See United States v. The Boeing Co., No.
05-1073-WEB, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 71625, at *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2009) (“A defense is
considered insufficient if it cannot succeed, as a matter of law, under any
circumstances.”);; Champion Bank v. Reg’l Dev., L.L.C., No. 4:08CV1807 CDP, 2009 WL
1351122, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May 13, 2009) (Motions to strike “should not be granted ‘unless
as a matter of law, the defense cannot succeed under any circumstances’” (quoting FDIC
v. Coble, 720 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D. Mo. 1989))); Wilhelm v. TLC Lawn Care, Inc., No.
07-2465-KHV, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13221, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 19, 2008) (“A defense is
insufficient if it cannot succeed, as a matter of law, under any circumstances.”);; Robertson
v. LTS Mgmt. Servs. L.L.C., 642 F. Supp. 2d 922, 933 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (“[T]he Court is
unable to state definitely that this defense could not succeed under any circumstances.”);;
Mark v. Gov’t Props. Trust, Inc., No. 8:06CV769, 2007 WL 1319712, at *3 (D. Neb. Apr. 5,
2007) (holding that a court “must be convinced . . . that under no set of circumstances can

Do Not Delete

398

12/17/2011 11:47 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:2

D. Summary of the Current State of the Affirmative Defense
Overall, the Twombly and Iqbal standard has not been
uniformly applied to affirmative defenses, and the majority of
courts dealing with the issue have not applied the plausibility
standard.124 Some may explicitly adopt or reject the standard,
while many simply dodge the issue and apply a different
standard.125 As the current state of the affirmative defense is
marred with a multitude of varying rules and rationales, the true
question becomes: What standard should ultimately be adopted?
In order to answer this question properly, a reconciliation must
be had between the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, the textual
language of the Rules, and the practical implications of adopting
a certain standard.
IV. ADOPTING THE PROPER STANDARD REQUIRES STRIKING THE
APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
DECISIONS, THE TEXT OF THE RULES, AND FAIRNESS CONCERNS TO
A DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF
To reiterate, when ruling on how properly to assess an
affirmative defense, district courts today are essentially left with
three standards: (1) apply the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility

the defense succeed” (quoting Puckett v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (S.D. Tex.
1999))). This standard is clearly inconsistent with the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility
standard, as allowing a defense to survive a motion to strike simply because it can
succeed under some conceivable circumstance certainly does not mean that the defense is
necessarily plausible.
124 In addition to the above categories, a number of decisions assumed, but did not
hold, that Twombly or Iqbal did or did not apply. See Ahle v. Veracity Research Co., 738
F. Supp. 2d 896, 925 (D. Minn. 2010) (“Even if the heightened pleading standards are not
applicable to affirmative defenses, Plaintiffs have not been given adequate notice [of the
affirmative defense].”);; Lapic v. MTD Prods., Inc., No. 09-760, 2009 WL 3030305, at *3
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2009) (“[E]ven if the new standards of Twombly apply to affirmative
defenses, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant’s affirmative defenses fail to give
him ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the defenses . . . .”).
125 This conclusion differs from that of other commentators and courts that have
concluded that the majority of courts actually do adopt the plausibility standard. See
Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167,
1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that most courts “have extended Twombly’s heightened
pleading standard to affirmative defenses”);; Dominguez et al., supra note 51, at 77 (“The
vast majority of district courts that have considered the issue . . . hold that Twombly’s
plausibility standard applies to [the pleading of] affirmative defenses”);; Mize, supra note
51, at 1260 (arguing that the majority of courts have applied the plausibility standard to
affirmative defenses). This Comment’s conclusion is based upon the fact that only the
decisions discussed and cited in Part III(A) apply the two part plausibility test. It is not
enough that a decision simply cites Twombly or Iqbal, but then goes on to apply a
different standard. The plausibility standard is a two part standard requiring facts and a
plausible defense. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. Anything less is not a
true Twombly and Iqbal analysis. Thus, this Comment concludes that based on the
totality of the decisions not listed in Part III(A), the majority of district courts are not
actually applying the Twombly and Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses.
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standard;126 (2) apply the Conley notice pleading standard;127 or
(3) apply the adequate factual basis standard.128 This Comment
proposes that the proper standard to be applied to an affirmative
defense is one that requires “the defendant to plead an adequate
factual basis for [his or her] affirmative defense[].”129 This would
not assess the plausibility of the defense, but only whether there
is a factual basis for the defense.130
One may argue that such a standard is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A.,131
where the Court held that Rule 8’s notice pleading standard is
“inextricably linked” amongst the Rules.132 However, even if
Swierkiewicz is the Court’s newest “notice pleading decision,”
Twombly and Iqbal are the Court’s only plausibility pleading
decisions.133
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions explicitly
overruled Conley’s notice pleading standard134 and in so doing,
broke any link a notice pleading regime may have had between
Rule 8 and the other Rules.135 Thus, to argue that Swierkiewicz
See supra Part III(A).
This encompasses those courts that explicitly rejected the plausibility standard
and applied a notice standard and those which did not explicitly reject the plausibility
standard, but applied a notice standard regardless. See supra Parts III(B)–(C)(i).
128 See supra Part III(C)(ii). To a lesser extent, this would encompass Voeks v. WalMart Stores, Inc, as that decision required factual particularity to the extent the
particular case and defense called for it. 2008 WL 89434, at *6.
129 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D 260, 268 (D.
Minn. 2009).
130 A fact-pleading standard would not assess the ability of the pleader to prove the
defense pled. See, e.g., 49A WILLIAM LINDSLEY, J.D. ET AL., CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE
3D PLEADING § 77 (2010) (“A [pleader] need only plead facts showing that he or she may be
entitled to some relief;; a court is not concerned with the [pleader’s] possible inability or
difficulty in proving the allegations of the [pleading].”). Rather, a standard requiring
facts to be pled, as this Comment’s proposed standard would, only focuses on the
defendant’s ability to plead a factual basis for the affirmative defense. This does not
require the reviewing judge to assess the plausibility of the defense, but it would still
require the defendant to comply with Rule 11, and thus, the defendant could not simply
conjure up some factual basis, which in reality never had any relevance to the defense.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (“By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or
other paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances: . . . the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery . . . .”).
131 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
132 Id. at 513.
133 See Scozzaro, supra note 28, at 429–30 (“Where Conley addressed the pleading
issue as an aside, Swierkiewicz took it head on and met it in the ‘center ring.’ . . .
Swierkiewicz will supplant Conley as ‘the’ notice pleading decision.”). See also supra Part
II (discussing Twombly’s and Iqbal’s plausibility standard).
134 See infra notes 143–46 and accompanying text (noting that Twombly and Iqbal
only interpreted Rule 8(a)).
135 See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 36 (2010) (noting that although
not explicit, the Twombly and Iqbal decisions essentially overruled Swierkiewicz).
126
127
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is anything more than a reminder that Conley was the proper
standard for a complaint is to overlook the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions’ language and purpose.136
When Iqbal explicitly
announced that “Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions,” it not
only defeated Swierkiewicz’s notice mandate, but it announced
that the plaintiff and defendant are not inextricably linked to the
same pleading standard.137
Thus, in light of Twombly and Iqbal, the issue becomes
whether affirmative defenses should remain untouched or if a
change is necessary. This Comment’s proposed adequate factual
basis standard is the proper solution to this issue due to: (1) the
textual language of Rule 8; (2) the policies expressed in Twombly
and Iqbal; and (3) overall fairness concerns to not only the
defendant, but the plaintiff as well.
A. Rule 8 Does Not Set Forth the Same Standard for
Complaints and Affirmative Defenses
Based on a simple textual reading of Rule 8(c) and Rule 8(a),
it is clear that the rules do not set forth identical standards for
affirmative defenses and complaints.138 According to Rule 8(c)
the defendant need only “affirmatively state any avoidance or
affirmative defense.”139 In contrast, Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a
136 See Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading With Congress to Resist the Urge to
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415, 437 (2010) (discussing why Twombly
and Iqbal show that the Court’s attention has now turned to addressing “the costs and
burdens of discovery in modern federal litigation”).
137 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (emphasis added). In so holding,
the Court was making it clear that its focus was now on controlling discovery, not
allowing discovery. See Sybil Dunlop & Elizabeth Cowan Wright, Plausible Deniability:
How the Supreme Court Created a Heightened Pleading Standard Without Admitting
They Did So, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 205, 241 (2010) (noting that the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions display that the Court has now recognized that the costs of discovery may force
parties to settle). This is clearly a break from the Swierkiewicz and Conley Court’s
rationale and focus on “liberal discovery.” Thomas, supra note 135 at 36 (explaining that
the Iqbal Court’s focus on controlling the scope and costs of discovery is clearly
inconsistent with the Swierkiewicz Court’s emphasis on “liberal discovery” (quoting
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002))). See also infra notes 143–46 and
accompanying text (discussing how Twombly and Iqbal were only meant to apply to
complaints).
138 See, e.g., FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, No. 09-1204, 2011 WL 883202, at *3 (D.
N.J. Mar. 10, 2011) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure distinguish the level of
pleading required between a plaintiff asserting a claim for relief under Rule 8(a) and a
defendant asserting an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c).”);; McLemore v. Regions Bank,
Nos. 3:08-cv-0021, 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 WL 1010092, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010)
(noting that although Rule 8(b) and Rule 8(a) both require an answer or a complaint,
respectively, to be stated “‘in short and plain terms’ . . . . ‘Rule 8(b) does not apply when a
defendant asserts an affirmative defense.”);; First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs.,
LTD, No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 149, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009)
(holding that Twombly was interpreting Rule 8(a), not 8(c)).
139 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (emphasis added).
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complaint “must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”140 Thus, a
defendant must only “affirmatively state”141 an affirmative
defense, while a plaintiff must “show” that he or she “is entitled
to relief.”142 The Rules necessarily require less of a defendant
pleading an affirmative defense than of a plaintiff pleading a
claim for relief. Most instructive of this lack of commonality is
that nowhere in Twombly or Iqbal does the Court mention either
answers or affirmative defenses.143 To be precise, Iqbal is strewn
with language, which, at a bare minimum, heavily implies that it
was only meant to apply to complaints:
Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief . . . .’”
....
[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions . . . .
[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives . . . .
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task . . . . But where the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “shown”[144]—
”that the pleader is entitled to relief.”145
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
143 A number of district courts explicitly recognized this lack of language in Twombly
and Iqbal. Ameristar Fence Prods., Inc. v. Phoenix Fence Co., No. CV-10-299-PHX-DGC,
2010 WL 2803907, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010) (“[T]he pleading standards enunciated in
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . have no application to affirmative defenses pled under
Rule 8(c).”);; McLemore v. Regions Bank, Nos. 3:08-cv-0021, 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 WL
1010092, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) (“[Twombly] does not mention affirmative
defenses or any other subsection of Rule 8. Iqbal also focused exclusively on the pleading
burden that applies to plaintiffs’ complaints.”). The Court was not interpreting what a
defendant must affirmatively state under Rule 8(c), but rather was only interpreting the
word “showing” which exclusively appears in Rule 8(a) governing complaints. See Kevin
M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1359
(2010). Thus, as Iqbal held that only “a complaint” must be plausible, the Court was
making it clear that it was only assessing the pleading requirements for complaints.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (emphasis added). See also Roger M.
Michalski, Assessing Iqbal, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (Dec. 8, 2010),
http://hlpronline.com/2010/12/assessing-iqbal/ (discussing how Twombly and Iqbal
are only concerned with Rule 8(a)); Sean Warjert, Does the Twombly-Iqbal Pleading
Standard Apply to Defenses Too?, MASSTORTDEFENSE (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://www.masstortdefense.com/2010/01/articles/does-the-twomblyiqbal-pleadingstandard-apply-to-defenses-too/ (“The Supreme Court addressed in Twombly the
requirements for a well-pled complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)’s ‘short and plain
statement’ requirement. No such language, however, appears within Rule 8(c), the
applicable rule for affirmative defenses. As such, Twombly’s analysis of the ‘short and
plain statement’ requirement of Rule 8(a) is inapplicable to a motion under Rule 8(c).”
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a))).
144 Recall that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief
140
141
142
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Furthermore, consider the language used in Twombly to
expound its holding:
[S]tating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual
matter . . . to suggest that an agreement was made . . . . And, of
course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a
savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable . . . .
....
The need . . . for allegations plausibly suggesting . . . agreement
reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the “plain
statement” possess enough heft to “sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”[146] . . . An allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a
naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint: it gets the complaint
close to stating a claim, but without some further factual
enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of “entitle[ment] to relief.”147

Contrast this language with that of Conley, which is much
more susceptible to a universal pleading interpretation:148
Such simplified “notice pleading” is made possible by the liberal
opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures

must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). However, Rule 8(c)(1)
requires only that “a party . . . affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative
defense . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (emphasis added).
145 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143,
157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009))).
Furthermore, during oral arguments, the Court was exclusively discussing whether the
Twombly standard applies outside the context of an antitrust claim. See Oral Argument,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), No. 07-1015, 2008 WL 5168391, at *21 (at oral
arguments in Iqbal, Justice Stevens noted that if the Court in Twombly felt the claim was
not plausible, then “this claim is implausible because it’s got exactly the same
problems . . . . It seems to me these cases are very similar” (emphasis added)).
146 See supra note 144 (noting the similarity of language used by the Court and Rule
8(a)).
147 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007) (emphasis added)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
Additionally, Twombly went to extra bounds to only overrule that part of Conley which
applies to complaints:
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further citations to show that
Conley’s “no set of facts” language has been questioned, criticized, and
explained away long enough. To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage
should be understood in light of the opinion’s preceding summary of the
complaint’s concrete allegations, which the Court quite reasonably understood
as amply stating a claim for relief . . . . The phrase is best forgotten as an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has
been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (emphasis added).
148 See Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
affirmative defenses, like complaints, are subject to Conley’s fair notice standard (citing
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007))).

Do Not Delete

2011]

12/17/2011 11:47 AM

Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 8(c)

403

established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both
claim and defense . . . . Following the simple guide of Rule 8(f) that
“all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice,” . . .
“[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of
skill . . . and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.149

When taken together, the Court in Twombly and Iqbal solely
intended to determine what a complaint under Rule 8(a) needs to
contain to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,150 not what
an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) must contain to survive a
Rule 12(f) motion to strike.151 Nonetheless, this break from
Conley’s notice standard necessarily raises the question of
whether the policies and effects of Twombly and Iqbal will
require a change to the standard applied to an affirmative
defense.152
B. A Standard That Requires Facts to Be Pled Will Combat the
Twombly and Iqbal Courts’ Concerns Regarding the Cost and
Broad Scope of Discovery
Although Twombly and Iqbal only raised the pleading
standard for a complaint, the Court did set forth a principle that
should apply to an affirmative defense.153 An affirmative defense
is not simply a denial, it is an assertion by the defendant
bringing with it new facts and allegations, which, if true, will
defeat the plaintiff’s claim, regardless of the complaint’s
legitimacy.154 As plaintiffs must investigate these assertions,
149 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 47–48 (1957) (emphasis added), abrogated by Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
150 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding that when faced with a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions”); Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (holding that a complaint will only survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss if the complaint “is plausible on its face”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
151 See supra notes 144–44 and accompanying text. See also Kevin M. Clermont &
Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 829 n.34
(2010) (noting that the Twombly and Iqbal Courts were interpreting the word “showing”
which is inapplicable under Rule 8(c)); Miller, supra note 51, at 101 (“Neither Rule 8(b)
nor Rule 8(c) contains the magic word ‘showing,’ and both modes of defensive pleading
typically are alleged in a formulary, conclusory, and uninformative fashion . . . .”).
152 As stated, it is this Comment’s proposal that, in light of Twombly and Iqbal, the
correct standard should require “the defendant to plead an adequate factual basis for [his
or her] affirmative defenses . . . .” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite
Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 268 (D. Minn. 2009).
153 See infra notes 154–54 and accompanying text.
154 Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003). An affirmative
defense is comparable to a complaint in that where the plaintiff has the burden to prove
the allegations in the complaint, the defendant has the burden to prove an affirmative
defense. See James River Ins. Co. v. Kemper Cas. Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 382, 385 (7th Cir.
2009) (holding that defendants have the burden of proof regarding an affirmative
defense); Moore v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc., 318 F.3d 561, 566 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that the defendant also has “the burden of production and the burden of persuasion for
[an] affirmative defense”). This, however, does not render their pleading standard to be
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affirmative defenses affect the scope of discovery as well.155
Thus, the Court’s intentions in Twombly and Iqbal to combat
discovery costs through a heightened pleading requirement
should apply, to some degree, to affirmative defenses.156
The Twombly Court was first to pronounce the Court’s
concern over discovery costs when it explained that the purpose
of adopting a heightened pleading requirement is to relieve the
parties of the high costs of discovery wasted on claims or defenses
which are not actually grounded in a factual basis.157 As Iqbal
confirmed, the focus of the pleadings now is to ensure that Rule 8
is not simply the means to discovery for a party “armed with
nothing more than conclusions.”158
the same. As noted above, the rules do not set forth the same standard, but rather, set
forth a lower standard for an affirmative defense. See supra note 144.
155 Although raising the pleading standard for a plaintiff will narrow the scope of
discovery, raising the standard for a defendant will narrow its scope even more, thereby
reducing costs to both parties. Thus, simply put, the broader the scope of discovery, the
more expensive discovery is; while the narrower the scope, the less expensive it becomes.
Compare Justice Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47
S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 209–10 (2005) (noting that when discovery’s scope is broad, “pretrial
costs normally far exceed those incurred at trial”), with Dwayne J. Hermes, Jeffrey W.
Kemp & Paul B. Moore, Leveling the Legal Malpractice Playing Field: Reverse Bifurcation
of Trials, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 879, 920 (2005) (noting that when the scope of discovery is
limited, it “will often enable the dispute to reach trial sooner than otherwise possible,
while reducing the discovery costs to the litigants . . . .”).
156 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (holding that where a
“complaint is deficient under Rule 8, [the complainant] is not entitled to discovery . . . .”);
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (holding that high discovery costs
create problems in litigation as they may force parties to settle in lieu of facing these
costs). Although it is true that this Comment concludes that the pleading standard
should be lower for affirmative defenses, it does not follow that it should not be raised. As
plaintiffs must seek discovery on affirmative defenses, in order to truly fulfill the Court’s
concern regarding the scope of discovery, the defendant should not simply be allowed to
assert a host of affirmative defenses without providing the plaintiff with some direction as
to their factual basis. See Susan S. DeSanti, Whither Antitrust in the Supreme Court?, 7
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1 (2007) (noting that the Court in Twombly concluded that lower
federal judges have been unable to control the costs of discovery in antitrust cases); Scott
Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 64 (2010) (noting that the
Supreme Court changed the pleading standard due to its concern over “high discovery
costs”);; Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1073 (2009)
(“[T]he Court expressed a concern that discovery costs were only increasing and that
lawsuits were being settled based on their in terrorem value rather than the actual merits
of the case.”). Consistent with the Court’s rationale, many district courts, as noted,
require facts to be affirmatively stated at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Cosmetic Warriors,
Ltd. v. Lush Boutique, L.L.C., No. 09-6381, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16392, at *4 (E.D. La.
Feb. 1, 2010) (holding that a defendant must provide “factual particularity” in the
affirmative defense); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266
F.R.D 260, 268 (D. Minn. 2009) (holding that affirmative defenses must be pled with “an
adequate factual basis”);; Stoffels v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-CV-0233-WWJ, 2008 WL
4391396, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) (holding that affirmative defenses require
“‘more than labels and conclusions’” and must be pled with “factual particularity” (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).
157 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
(2005)).
158 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. See also Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited
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Thus, as Twombly pointed out, Conley’s requirement that
mere notice will suffice159 no longer serves its purpose of allowing
parties to bring their meritorious claims to court.160 Instead of
fulfilling this goal, oftentimes pleadings were simply a
mechanism to force another party to settle out of fear that
discovery costs would make fighting a claim financially
irresponsible.161 These increased costs often meant that parties
and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 868 (2010)
(“[A] screening goal requires greater specificity. The requisite level of specificity is set by
the strictness of the pleading standard, which in turn reflects a policy decision about how
much screening is optimal at the pleading stage.”).
159 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
160 Under Conley, pleading did not require parties to have specialized knowledge
about technicalities and rules; rather, the pleadings were simply meant to “facilitate a
proper decision on the merits.” Id. at 48. However, with the increasing costs of discovery,
allowing such easy access past the pleadings meant that the pleadings may now “push
cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before even reaching pretrial
proceedings.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. Thus, the overall concern of the Twombly Court
was that Conley’s notice pleading allowed parties to abuse discovery “by substituting
expenses for merits as the driving force behind litigation and settlement dynamics.”
Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 77
(1997). The Court’s concern is actually echoed in the Rules themselves. Rule 1 provides
that the Rules “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. As discovery
and litigation in general has grown more expensive though, this mandate by the Rules
has become less feasible. See Elaine L. Spencer, Common Sense Trial Preparation in a
High-Tech World, 15 THE PRAC. LITIGATOR 7, 7 (2004) (“Whether representing the plaintiff
or the defendant, lawyers know that far from being ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive,’ the
cost of litigation can bar plaintiffs from pursuing their claims and can force defendants to
settle claims that really should be brought in front of a factfinder.” (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 1)).
161 B. Scott Daugherty, Comment, Uncharted Waters: Securities Class Actions in
Texas After the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J.
143, 160–61, (1999). Oftentimes then, a litigant with an otherwise meritorious claim
would be faced with a choice of pursuing litigation and risking that the award would
outweigh the costs of discovery, or simply settling, foregoing the costs of discovery. See
Alistair Dawson, House Bill 4 and the Future of Class Action Litigation, 24 THE ADVOC.
(TEX.) 60, 63 (2003) (noting that “regardless of the merits,” in class action cases,
oftentimes defendants would prefer to settle than to bear the high cost of discovery);
Cameron S. Matheson, Transvestite Cowboys, Thieving Brokers, and the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act: SLUSA’s Trap for the Unwary Plaintiff, 35 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 121, 126 (2004) (noting that the high costs associated with discovery may allow a
party with a frivolous suit to force the other party to settle); Sue Ann Mota, Global
Antitrust Enforcement: The Sherman Act Does Not Apply Without Any Direct Domestic
Effect, But Discovery Assistance May Be Available to Aid a Foreign Tribunal, According to
the U.S. Supreme Court, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 495, 510 (2004) (explaining that when
discovery is involved in litigation, oftentimes its costs “may force parties to settle”);;
Mathias Reinmann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First
Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 817 n.351 (2003)
(discussing why the high costs of discovery can work against a plaintiff as “those with
small and medium-sized claims” may not be able to fully pursue these claims as the costs
of discovery will often outweigh the small sum sought in the recovery); Jessica Lynn Repa,
Comment, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business: Why the Inaccessibility
Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 257, 295–96 (2004) (noting that high discovery costs create incentives to settle, even
for meritorious suits). Furthermore, not only are discovery costs excessive, much of it
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with meritorious claims, but small amounts sought in the
recovery, would have to forgo their claims, as the amount sought
would not outweigh the costs of discovery.162 This is particularly
true with electronic discovery in which “[t]he sheer volume of
electronic data that may be responsive to a given document
request can burden the responding party with tremendous
costs.”163 Although the mere act of producing electronic discovery
may not be significant, the data that is responsive to a particular
discovery request must be screened for privileged information,
which in turn can be complex and create high costs for the
responding party.164 With the increasing costs of discovery and
results from pure waste. See Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean
Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal
Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 551 (1998) [hereinafter Willging et al., Empirical
Study] (concluding that when discovery costs are disproportionately high, much of the
information obtained in discovery is ultimately irrelevant to the case).
162 See Christopher M. Grengs & Edward S. Adams, Contracting Around Finality:
Transforming Price v. Neal from Dictate to Default, 89 MINN. L. REV. 163, 186 n.172
(2004). Instead of individually bringing a claim, high discovery costs may force the
litigant to seek a class that can sue collectively, out of fear that the costs of discovery will
outweigh any potential damage claims brought individually. See Barry Litt & Genie
Harrison, Rights for Wrongs, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2005, at 27 (noting that in order to properly
compensate victims with small sums sought in recovery, the only cost-effective way may
be to bring a class action).
163 Thomas R. Mulroy & Kristopher Stark, Article, A Suggested Rule for Electronic
Discovery in Illinois Administrative Proceedings, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2004)
(describing a case where one party “spent $1.75 million to restore backup tapes to retrieve
email.”). Thus, with the increase in electronic products available and the increased use of
technology, comes a concomitant rise in the amount of information that is discoverable.
See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 7 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds.,
2005) (noting that electronic documents have now surpassed the amount of paper
documents which has increased “the amount of information available for potential
discovery”);; Mulroy & Stark, supra, at 1 (explaining how an increase in reliance on
technology brings about an increase in the amount of information that may be
discoverable during litigation); Sonia Salinas, Electronic Discovery and Cost Shifting: Who
Foots the Bill?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1639, 1640 (2005) (discussing that with the increased
use of technology and computers, a dramatic rise in the cost of discovery has ensued. Now
simply requesting a document “may include not only the paper copy of the document, but
also various versions saved on a network or hard drive”);; Paul Travis, The Cost of EDiscovery, NETWORK COMPUTING (May 9, 2009), http://www.networkcomputing.com/ediscovery/the-cost-of-e-discovery.php?type=article (“Businesses and other organizations
spent more than $2.7 billion on electronic data discovery last year [EDD], and spending
on EDD will grow to more than $4.6 billion by 2010 . . . .”).
164 Ronald J. Hedges, Discovery of Digital Information, in ELECTRONIC RECORDS
MANAGEMENT AND DIGITAL DISCOVERY 221, 258 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials
SK071, 2005). See also Steven C. Bennett, Marla S.K. Bergman & Jones Day, Ethical
Issues in Electronic Discovery, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND RETENTION GUIDANCE FOR
CORPORATE COUNSEL 2005, 379, 386 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser.
No. 733, 2005) (noting that due to the multitude of ways to now create and send
information, a correlative increase in the costs of discovery has ensued); Richard Van
Duizend, Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of Electronically-Stored
Information—What? Why? How?, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 237, 240 (2007) (discussing how the
high costs of discovery can be attributed to the “costs of experts” needed to prepare the
information); Robert E. Altman & Benjamin Lewis, Note, Cost-Shifting in ESI Discovery
Disputes: A Five Factor Test to Promote Consistency and Set Party Expectations, 36 N. KY.
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electronic discovery, a pleading standard focused on providing
factual support to the plaintiff will assist tremendously in
narrowing the scope of discovery and, thus, reducing these
costs.165
To be fair though, there is another side to the debate as to
whether discovery costs truly are an issue today. Although there
are studies that show discovery costs have gotten out of
control,166 some argue that it is only a small number of cases with
high discovery costs which “generate[] the anecdotal ‘parade of
horribles’” causing such concern among those seeking changes to
the discovery controls and procedures.167 One recent study found
L. REV. 569, 571 (2009) (“[O]ne primary reason for the high costs of electronic discovery is
simply the large volume of ESI [electronically stored information].”).
165 See Robins, supra note 29, at 642 (arguing that by requiring facts to be pled, the
opposing party at least has “knowledge of the basis for the claim [or defense], thus
manifesting any known basis for the claim’s legitimacy”);; Marlaina S. Freisthler,
Comment, Unfettered Discretion: Is Gonzaga University v. Doe a Constructive End to
Enforcement of Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Provisions?, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1397,
1415–16 (2003) (“In fact, ‘in civil cases, high discovery costs and legal fees render legal
assistance beyond the financial reach of ninety percent of the nation.’” (citing Joseph M.
McLaughlin, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se Litigant’s Right to
Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV.
1109, 1135 (1987))). Thus, the plaintiff should not be the sole bearer of a heightened
pleading requirement; rather, it should be up to both pleadings to narrow the scope of
discovery. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery
Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 75 (1995). Furthermore, in creating a heightened pleading
requirement for both parties, access to the courts will be equalized in that both the
wealthy and the average person will be more likely to be able to afford the costs of
litigation. See Allegra J. Lawrence-Hardy & Nathan D. Chapman, Clarity of Chaos?
Ashcroft v. Iqbal One Year Later, 4 BLOOMBERG L. REP. 39 (2010), available at
http://www.sutherland.com/files/Publication/339b9dd3-0d19-4b34-8697-5c6869dc5655/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e31d5169-f7c7-475e-88ea-61108cfae7e5/2010%
20A%20%20Lawrence-Hardy%20N%20%20Chapman%20-%20Clarity%20or%20Chaos%
20-%20Ashcroft%20v%20%20Iqbal%20One%20Year%20Lat.pdf (“[C]ourts have noted that
the desire to avoid unnecessary discovery applies with equal force [to defendants] as
well.”);; John Burritt McArthur, Inter-Branch Politics and the Judicial Resistance to
Federal Civil Justice Reform, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 551, 617 (1999) (noting that most groups,
even “corporate counsel,” believe that discovery costs create inequities as the wealthy can
bear the costs, but the average person cannot do so).
166 See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE
JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYER’S TASK FORCE ON
DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
A-4
(2008),
available
at
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
Home&CONTENTID=3650&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (finding that of those
attorneys surveyed, “[o]ver 75% . . . agreed that discovery costs, as a share of total
litigation costs, have increased disproportionately due to the advent of e-discovery”). See
also Michael P. Catina & Cindy M. Schmitt, Note, Private Securities Litigation: The Need
for Reform, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 295, 303 (1998) (noting that when plaintiffs
use discovery simply as a “fishing expedition[]” its costs will often cause defendants to
settle in lieu of dealing with the continuous discovery requests); Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin
& Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the
Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 367 (2000) (noting that as the amount of discoverable
information continues to grow, discovery costs will do so as well).
167 Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel,
39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 685 (1998) (quoting James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management:
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that the median discovery costs today are on par with those of
the 1990s after adjustments are made for inflation, and that the
“monetary stakes in the litigation represent the primary cost
driver in most civil litigation.”168 Thus, the argument goes, the
majority of cases today actually do not have to deal with high
discovery costs,169 and so there is no need to change the current
pleading scheme or discovery rules.170
Whether it is only a small number of cases in which
discovery costs are high, or whether discovery costs are high
across the board, the fact is that discovery costs are high, and
furthermore, the Supreme Court has announced its
interpretation of Rule 8, along with its intention to use the
pleadings as a mechanism to control discovery.171 Requiring an
adequate factual basis to be pled is consistent with this intention,
as attorneys will now have to plead factual support for their
defenses, which in turn means that the plaintiff will have a much
more effective way to focus the scope of discovery, thereby
reducing costs.172 In fact, in a recent survey conducted by the
Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613,
636 (1998)).
168 Emory G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal
Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 770–72 (2010). Thus, many studies have shown that
for the most part, parties are fairly reasonable in their discovery requests, and do not use
discovery as a means to harass the other side. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials,
2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 202 n.116 (2006) (noting that the majority of research conducted
actually finds that discovery costs are reasonable); Willging et al., Empirical Study, supra
note 161, at 527 (concluding that high discovery costs are normally associated only with
the most complex cases, and the average case is actually “conducted at costs that are
proportionate to the stakes of the litigation . . . .”).
169 Kakalik et al., supra note 167, at 636. Thus, these proponents argue that the data
relied on by others skews the truth, in that it fails to display that the large costs of
discovery are truly only borne by a small few who are engaged in complex litigation. See
The Honorable John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: The Latest Retreat From Notice
Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2009).
170 See Sullivan, supra note 169, at 55.
171 See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text. It should be fairly apparent that
it is not up to the lower courts to second-guess the findings of the Supreme Court. See
Gonzalez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrs., 366 F.3d 1253, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that
lower federal courts “must follow” a “Supreme Court decision . . . regardless of whether
[the lower court] would have arrived at a different approach.”), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005); Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that Supreme Court decisions must be followed by lower courts). Therefore,
whichever side courts would like to fall on in the cost of discovery debate, the Supreme
Court has already chosen a side, and lower courts must take the same side. Thus, the
issue in this context is not whether the Supreme Court is right, but rather, the issue
becomes one of how to properly implement its decision.
172 Molot, supra note 25, at 982–83. Fact pleading greatly assists litigants, as it
requires more than a mere labeling of a claim or defense, but also the basis for that claim
or defense. See Michele Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L.
659, 675 (2003). This prevents attorneys from quickly filing boilerplate claims or
defenses, as the attorney must investigate said claims or defenses and determine if there
is any factual basis to them. Id. Having conducted this initial investigation, once the
claim or defense is filed, the parties have less need to search for relevant facts or evidence
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Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System,
“[o]ver 64% of [respondents] indicated that fact pleading can
narrow the scope of discovery.”173 Therefore, a federal regime,
which is now truly focused on using pleadings to control the
scope and costs of discovery,174 should adopt a pleading standard
consistent with that purpose.175

to support the claim or defense. Id. With such basis in hand, a pleader has the ability to
properly control the scope and costs of discovery. See Gregory Gelfand & Howard B.
Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 977 n.128 (1998)
(discussing how adopting a heightened pleading standard will narrow the scope of
discovery). See also Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of
Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 334 (2001) (“[T]he badges of fact
pleading included[:] . . . (ii) demanding ‘specificity’ or ‘particularity’ on each element of a
claim or cause of action; (iii) expressing dissatisfaction with ‘conclusory’ allegations; [and]
(iv) deploring the evil of ‘frivolous’ litigation . . . .”);; Roger T. Brice & Penny Nathan
Kahan, Discovery Issues in Employment Discrimination Cases—Including Views From the
Bench, in 32ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW VOL. ONE 567, 613 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. H-696, 2003) (arguing that in order to
decrease the costs of electronic discovery, the scope of discovery must be narrowed).
173 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 166, at A-3.
174 See supra Part II (describing the Supreme Court’s shift from using pleadings as a
means to access discovery to using pleadings as a means to narrow issues and lower the
costs of discovery).
175 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. A pleading standard that will require
all affirmative defenses to be pled with an adequate factual basis is consistent with this
purpose. A fact pleading standard will create more specificity in the pleadings and less
opportunity for deceit. Through these benefits, discovery costs will necessarily be
decreased as the parties will have some semblance of an idea as to how to properly focus
discovery. See Burroughs, supra note 30, at 78 (noting that fact “pleading[] serve[s] to
narrow the issues in litigation, identify baseless claims, and present each party’s position
based upon the facts as known to them”);; Bedora A. Sheronick, Comment, Rock, Scissors,
Paper: The Federal Rule 26(a)(1) “Gamble” in Iowa, 80 IOWA L. REV. 363, 381 (1995)
(discussing that a regime requiring facts to be pled from the beginning of litigation has
two major benefits; namely (1) that discovery costs will be decreased; and (2) the issues
for trial, as well as discovery, will be narrowed). Another incidental benefit of adopting
such a fact-based standard for affirmative defenses would occur in the insurance litigation
realm. See R. Nicholas Gimbel & Elizabeth W. Fox, Key Discovery Battlegrounds
Regarding Coverage Under CGL Policies, in INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION: RECOVERY
IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND 305, 310 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser.
No. H-598, 1999) (discussing how insurance companies will allege affirmative defenses
simply to “act as place keepers or reservations depending on what is uncovered during the
course of discovery”). For fear of waiving an affirmative defense that may end up freeing
the insurance company from liability, insurance companies will plead “every conceivable
affirmative defense,” even those with no factual support. See Richard D. Milone &
Stephen R. Freeland, The Kitchen Sink Approach, CONN. L. TRIB., May 2008, at 1,
available at http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/0371/_res/id=Files/index=0/
0371.pdf. What is worse, is that insurance companies will “resist[] all efforts by the
insured to obtain discovery of the factual basis for such alleged defenses.” Amanda
Hairston, Insurer Ordered to Produce Facts Regarding Affirmative Defenses, Drafting
History and Underwriting Testimony, FARELLA BRAUN & MARTEL, LLP (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.farellacoveragelaw.com/2010/03/insurer-ordered-to-produce-facts.html. Such
practice has become standard, which has only resulted in higher costs for litigation, as the
plaintiff has little direction in how to focus his or her discovery requests. See Ray E.
Critchett, Ferreting Out Affirmative Defenses, 19 OHIO TRIAL 26, 26 (2009), available at
http://www.buckeyelaw.com/team/e_ray_critchett/Affirmative_Defenses.pdf.
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C. It Is Unfair to Hold a Defendant to a Plausibility Standard
as a Defendant Has Only Twenty-One Days to Respond to a
Complaint That May Have Been Prepared for Years
Although the Twombly and Iqbal Courts set forth a principle
that should apply to an affirmative defense, applying the
plausibility standard to a defendant is patently unfair.176
Imagine you have been in a car accident in which the other
driver has suffered substantial injuries. That driver, having
taken two years to gather enough information about the accident,
sues you in federal district court (assume there is diversity
jurisdiction)177 alleging that your negligence was the sole cause of
the accident. That driver has you personally served with the
summons and complaint.178 You now have twenty-one days to
respond.179 It takes you a week to find a lawyer you can afford,
and now your time to respond is only fourteen days.180 Another
week goes by, and your attorney decides to plead some
affirmative defenses in hopes that one of them will apply, or at
the least, will provide a basis for discovery.181 Since you decline
to include any factual support gathered during an initial
investigation, your affirmative defense simply states: “Plaintiff’s

176 See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text (explaining why narrowing the
scope of discovery should apply to a defendant as well as to a plaintiff).
177 Assume that the other driver is a citizen of another state and is suing you for
$75,001. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States . . . .”).
178 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c). Further assume that the driver has successfully pled
enough facts to lead a judge to believe her complaint is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
179 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (noting that in the absence of waiver of summons,
the defendant’s time to answer is not extended beyond twenty-one days).
180 Rule 6 defines the standards for computing time. FED. R. CIV. P. 6. Under that
rule:
When the [time to respond] is stated in days or a longer unit of time: (A)
exclude the day of the event that triggers the period; (B) count every day,
including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and (C) include
the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
Id. Thus, for purposes of the above hypothetical, assume you were served on January 7,
2011. The deadline for your response would be January 28, 2011. FED. R. CIV. P.
12(a)(1)(A)(i).
181 It is common practice to plead all affirmative defenses which may apply in hopes
of later ascertaining relevant evidence to rid the defendant of liability. See Gimbel & Fox,
supra note 175, at 309–10 (1999) (describing how insurance companies plead any and all
defenses in the hopes that one will apply). See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles
Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 979 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that discovery under the
Rules “provides that ‘[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party . . . .’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1))).
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negligence was the sole cause of the accident.”182 With two days
before the twenty-one day timeline runs up, your attorney files
your answer. Another two weeks go by, and the plaintiff files a
motion to strike your affirmative defense.183 What result?
Under this Comment’s proposed standard, this affirmative
defense would most certainly fail184 as it lacks any factual basis
to support it, and instead, pleads only a conclusory allegation.185
By neglecting to provide the plaintiff with the facts used to
support the defense, the plaintiff is stuck pondering the various
ways the defendant may believe the plaintiff has been
contributorily negligent.186 One could hypothesize a multitude of
ways this could be true: (1) Plaintiff may have been driving while
intoxicated;187 (2) Plaintiff may have been speeding;188 (3)
Plaintiff may have failed to drive on the right side of the road;189
or (4) Plaintiff may have failed to yield the right of way.190 The
list could go on, but one can understand the difficulties a plaintiff
182 Rule 8(c)(1) lists a number of affirmative defenses including contributory
negligence. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
183 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).
184 However, it would very likely survive a pre-Twombly motion to strike, because
merely listing the affirmative defense correctly was often acceptable. See, e.g., Home Ins.
Co. v. Matthews, 998 F.2d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 1993) (“A plea that simply states that
complainant was guilty of contributory negligence . . . is sufficient.”).
185 A number of district courts held that conclusory allegations in an affirmative
defense are no longer acceptable. See, e.g., Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc.,
No. 5: 10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *6 (W.D. Va. June 24, 2010) (striking the
defendant’s affirmative defenses for being conclusory);; Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit
Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172–73 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking
affirmative defenses for consisting largely of “conclusory statements”);; Burns v. Dodeka,
L.L.C., No. 4:09-CV-19-BJ, 2010 WL 1903987, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2010) (striking
affirmative defenses that “are wholly conclusory and fail to plead any facts that
demonstrate the plausibility of such defenses as required by Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly . . . .”). Regardless of the standard ultimately adopted by courts, this appears to
be a fairly common minimum standard and is something in which litigators should be
aware. See David N. Anthony & Timothy J. St. George, “Plausibility” Pleading After
Twombly and Iqbal, 21 THE PRAC. LITIGATOR 9, 13 (2010), available at
http://www.troutmansanders.com/files/Uploads/Documents/iqbal2.pdf (“Since Iqbal[,] . . .
certain courts are displaying an increasing tendency to scrutinize such ‘bare-boned’
averments on the basis that such pleading does not comport with the standards
articulated in Twombly and Iqbal.”).
186 See Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 2009)
(indicating that “the purpose of pleading requirements is to provide . . . some plausible,
factual basis for the assertion and not simply a suggestion of possibility that it may apply
to the case”).
187 See Scott v. Thompson, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 847 (2010) (alleging driver’s
intoxication constituted negligence), modified, No. G041860, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 996
(June 25, 2010).
188 See Rodkey v. City of Escondido, 67 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Cal. 1937) (holding driver
negligent for driving over storm drain while speeding).
189 See People v. Thompson, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803, 808 (2000) (stating that “failure to
drive on right side of road” can constitute negligence), modified, No. H017519, 2000 Cal.
App. LEXIS 282 (April 14, 2000).
190 See Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351, 356 (2005) (alleging
negligence for “failure to yield right of way”).
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would face if mere notice were required.191 On the other hand, if
Twombly’s and Iqbal’s plausibility standard were applied, the
defendant would have to plead enough facts to raise the
affirmative defense to a level of plausibility.192 This may require
an entire host of responses, such as alleging that the plaintiff had
been drinking sometime in the day or alleging that the plaintiff
had been drinking thirty minutes prior to the accident, for a
specific length of time, which was the sole cause of the
accident.193 However, by only requiring “the defendant to plead
an adequate factual basis for [the] affirmative defense[,]”194 the
191 See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 505, 517 (2000) (“[T]he information-gathering and issue-defining functions that
discovery must perform in a notice-pleading regime require broad and often copious
discovery that generates disputes that require judicial intervention to resolve. Depending
on one’s definition, this voluminous discovery may also lend itself to ‘abuse.’”). One main
concern about notice pleading, then, is that it largely left the other pleader in the dark.
Deprived of any knowledge as to what basis there was for a claim or defense, the other
party, quite understandably so, sought as much information as possible in discovery in
order to protect him or herself. See Mark E. Chopko, Continuing the Lord’s Work and
Healing His People: A Reply to Professors Lupu and Tuttle, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1897, 1916
n.113 (2004) (discussing that under a system of notice pleading, “the parties might guess
what discovery might bring”);; Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort
Litigation: A Response to Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 1, 33 (2004) (“[T]he notice pleading system and discovery rules in the
United States are so liberal that they allow plaintiffs to bring suits based on minimal
facts with ample room to flesh them out later.”);; Marcus, supra note 23, at 492 (noting
that notice pleading allows parties access to broad discovery which can easily lend itself to
abuse); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an
Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981, 2001 (2004)
(arguing that under a system of notice pleading, it is difficult for the opposing party to
understand the factual basis for the other’s claim or defense).
192 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
193 See, e.g., Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (adopting
the plausibility standard in civil rights actions, requiring the complainant to “allege[]
enough facts to suggest, raise a reasonable expectation of, and render plausible the fact
that he sincerely held the religious belief that got him fired”); Allison Sirica, Case
Comment, The New Federal Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009),
62 FLA. L. REV. 547, 554 (2010) (noting the difficulty in determining how many facts are
required to be pled in order to render a claim plausible). As stated, this Comment does
not criticize the plausibility standard as applied to a complaint. The purpose of this
paragraph is only to display that whatever the particular requirements of the plausibility
standard actually are, they are necessarily higher than that of a standard which only
requires facts to be pled. See Michael Eaton, The Key to the Courthouse Door: The Effect of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and the Heightened Pleading Standard, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299,
314 (2011) (noting that “after Iqbal the pleading standard is notably higher. . . .”).
Compare Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (holding that “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face’”
(emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))), with
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 268 (D. Minn.
2009) (holding that the defendant only needs “to plead an adequate factual basis for
affirmative defenses, where the basis is not apparent by the defense’s bare assertion”).
For a discussion on the uncertainty a party faces when held to a plausibility standard, see
Pamela Atkins, Twombly, Iqbal Introduce More Subjectivity to Rulings on Dismissal
Motions, Judge Says, 78 U.S.L. WK. 2667, 2667 (2010) (“[T]he new approach calls for
‘tremendous subjectivity’ on the part of a judge reviewing motions to dismiss.”).
194 EEOC, 266 F.R.D. at 268.
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defendant is given much greater control over whether or not that
defense will survive a motion to strike.195
The point is that a plaintiff may have years to decide when
to file a complaint, 196 while a defendant only has twenty-one
days to respond.197 Responding to a complaint requires a host of
actions by the defendant within this mere twenty-one day
timeline, such as hiring an attorney, researching the complaint
and applicable defenses, and communicating with the attorney
regarding the appropriate strategy for the case.198 Given the
time disparities, it is not unreasonable to require more factual
development of a plaintiff at the pleading stage.199 Worse yet, if
195 The defendant has greater control because the judge is not required to assess the
ability of the defendant to prove what is being pled. Rather, the defendant simply has to
provide the factual basis for the defense so that the plaintiff can efficiently narrow the
scope of his or her discovery. Thus, the defendant’s attorney would know that he or she
cannot merely assert any boilerplate defense, but would have to first uncover some factual
basis for the defense. See Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan.
2009) (asserting the importance of facts in affirmative defenses rather than mere
conjectures that may apply); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691
(N.D. Ohio 2010) (noting that boilerplate affirmative defenses can negatively impact
litigation costs); Gambol, supra note 52, at 2198 (footnote omitted) (stating that providing
a factual basis allows the adverse party to tailor discovery). Furthermore, by pleading an
affirmative defense, the defendant is not somehow making discovery available to him or
herself. It is the complaint that “unlock[s] the doors of discovery.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1950. See also FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, L.L.C., No. 09-1204, 2011 WL 883202, at
*3 (D. N.J. Mar. 10, 2011). Thus, “should the [p]laintiff need to request the factual basis
of an asserted affirmative defense . . . Twombly and Iqbal do not counsel otherwise.” Id.
196 See, e.g., Allstar Mayflower, L.L.C. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 169, 171 (2010)
(applying the three year statute of limitations under the Interstate Commerce Act);
Simpson v. Merchs. & Planters Bank, 441 F.3d 572, 579 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
statute of limitations under the Equal Pay Act is three years).
197 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).
198 Michael A. Iannucci, Changing the Game: The Effect of Twombly/Iqbal on
Affirmative
Defenses,
THE
LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER
(Oct.
25,
2010),
http://www.blankrome.com/pdf.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=2336.
199 See Holdbrook v. SAIA Motor Freight Line, L.L.C., No. 09-cv-02870-LTB-BNB,
2010 WL 865380, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2010). It has been argued that in Twombly and
Iqbal the Court was establishing “a gatekeeping test” for parties seeking to bring suit into
court. Clermont, supra note 143, at 1360. As defendants do not initiate litigation, the
argument goes that this test should not apply to them. Id. However, this Comment does
not go as far to conclude that no change should be made to the pleading standard for
affirmative defenses. This Comment does, though, note the inherent unfairness in
requiring a defendant to file a response to a complaint, which may have been researched
for years, within twenty-one days. See R. David Donoghue, The Uneven Application of
Twombly in Patent Cases: An Argument for Leveling the Playing Field, 8 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 12 (2008) (arguing that in patent cases, giving defendants either
twenty days or sixty days to file a plausible defense is “unrealistic . . . . [because] [d]uring
those three to eight weeks, a defendant must digest the complaint, hire counsel, analyze
the patent and the alleged infringement, and at least sketch out a ‘plausible’ set of
noninfringement and invalidity defenses, all while continuing to meet the obligations of
defendant’s business”). Thus, a balance needs to be struck, and it is this Comment’s
ultimate proposal that a pleading standard requiring a factual basis to be pled is this
balance. Furthermore, a proper application of this Comment’s proposed rule would
examine the affirmative defense in conjunction with the complaint. This would best
provide the reviewing court and the parties with the proper and most complete factual
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the defendant fails to plead an affirmative defense, that defense
is generally waived and likely to be permanently excluded from
the case.200 “[A]lthough the court, in its discretion, may give the
defendant leave to amend” its insufficiently pled affirmative
defense,201 this is by no means a guarantee, and a defendant
should attempt to plead as many applicable defenses as possible
at the pleading stage.202
Of course a defendant could simply plead any and all
affirmative defenses in the mere hope that one will survive a
motion to strike.203 This would be acceptable, but for Rule 11.204
Rule 11, among other things, requires any pleading filed by an
attorney to “have evidentiary support or . . . [to be] likely [to]
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery . . . .”205 Thus, a defendant who
asserts an affirmative defense without reasonably believing the

basis for the defendant’s affirmative defenses. See Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010) (noting that when
taken together, a complaint and an answer provide a plaintiff with sufficient notice of the
affirmative defense).
200 Harris v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Dole v. Williams Enters., Inc., 876 F.2d 186, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
201 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 297–98 (3d ed. 1999).
202 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 39, at 253. Thus, to be safe, it is generally advised,
or at least was advised under Conley’s standard, that a defendant should plead any and
all defenses that may apply in order to avoid missing out on a defense that may
ultimately relieve the defendant of liability. See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134
(3d Cir. 2002) (“Parties are generally required to assert affirmative defenses early in
litigation, so they may be ruled upon, prejudice may be avoided, and judicial resources
may be conserved.”);; Campania Mgmt. Co. v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843, 852 (7th.
Cir. 2002) (citing Grain Traders Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 160 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1998));
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Moore, 783 F.2d 1326, 1327–28 (9th Cir. 1986)) (holding that a party
cannot assert an affirmative defense after failing to do so in the answer); SRAM Corp. v.
Shimano, Inc., 25 F. App’x 626, 629 (9th. Cir. 2002) (citing Nw. Acceptance Corp. v.
Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Where a defendant fails to
raise the defense in a pretrial order or prior to trial, the defense is waived.”);; Wilkes
Assocs. v. Hollander Indus. Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 944, 951 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (stating that
Rule 8(c) requires a defendant to plead all applicable affirmative defenses in the answer);
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 201, at 299 (“A careful pleader necessarily will set forth
every conceivable fact that she might wish to prove as one never can be certain what a
court will hold to be a ‘surprise.’”).
203 See, e.g., Anthony & St. George, supra note 185, at 13 (noting that it is a “common
litigation strategy” for attorneys to plead as many affirmative defenses as possible at the
pleading stage); Richard G. Morgan & William N.G. Barron IV, Evolving with Affirmative
Defense Pleading Standard, LAW360 (2010), http://www.bowmanandbrooke.com/
files/News/c3d848bb-cc6e-42dc-985e-8f5f99ed161f/Presentation/NewsAttachment/
6573e813-8556-46af-9071-91d09edf6477/Law360%20-%200310.pdf (explaining that the
reason behind pleading all possible affirmative defenses is to avoid having those defenses
waived and excluded from the case).
204 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (detailing how pleadings, motions, and other
papers should be signed, the representations an attorney makes to the court and the use
of sanctions).
205 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
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defense to be “factually and legally justified” will likely subject
him or herself to Rule 11 sanctions.206
Taken together with Twombly and Iqbal, a defendant’s
attorney is torn between risking the filing of an affirmative
defense that reasonably is not, or could not be, plausible and thus
subject to Rule 11 sanctions, and filing an affirmative defense
that may surpass Rule 11’s floor, but still fails to rise to a level of
plausibility and, thus, is stricken permanently from the case.207
206 Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003). See FTC
v. Hope Now Modifications, L.L.C., No. 09-1204 (JBS/JS), 2011 WL 883202, at *4 (D. N.J.
Mar. 10, 2011) (noting that “although Twombly and Iqbal do not require specificity in
stating defenses,” a defendant’s counsel who pleads a frivolous defense may be subject to
Rule 11 sanctions). Furthermore, a defendant’s “subjective good faith” belief is not
enough and there must be actual support for the affirmative defense. Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985). For a list of possible
sanctions for violating Rule 11, see FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (noting
that possible sanctions for violating Rule 11 include “striking the offending paper; issuing
an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other
educational programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; [or] referring the matter to
disciplinary authorities . . . .”). For cases where defendant’s attorneys were sanctioned for
filing affirmative defenses in violation of Rule 11, see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kellogg,
856 F. Supp. 25, 33 (D. N.H. 1994) (awarding sanctions because defendant’s counsel failed
“to make a reasonable inquiry” into the legal basis for the affirmative defense pled);
Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel v. Aronoff, 638 F. Supp. 714, 725–26 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (awarding attorneys’ fees for attorney filing a frivolous affirmative defense which
caused plaintiff’s counsel to expend funds in the investigation of the defense).
207 See D. Jeffrey Campbell & Jonathan R. Kuhlman, Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990: An Experiment Gone Awry, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 17, 28 (1993) (explaining that Rule 11
can harm a defendant because the defendant likely does not have much factual support
for an affirmative defense prior to discovery and thus when it does come time for
discovery and the defendant is unable to produce evidence in support of the defense, the
plaintiff may move for Rule 11 sanctions). For a discussion that Rule 11 should be used in
lieu of a plausibility standard to deal with insufficient pleadings, see Lonny S. Hoffman,
Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach
Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1254 (2008) (“[A]n
allegation that is implausible may also be said to violate Rule 11(b)(3) . . . .”);; Mize, supra
note 51, at 1267 (arguing that Rule 11 can be used to “combat the frivolous and
bothersome claims that were a partial reason for the Court raising the [pleading]
standard”);; A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 485–86
(2008) (“[T]he Twombly Court’s statement that the plausibility standard would make sure
that there is a ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant
evidence’ in support of the claim steps directly on the toes of Rule 11 because under that
rule counsel already are certifying that asserted claims and allegations are warranted by
the evidence . . . .” (footnote omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
559 (2007))). The above-cited articles, admittedly, make a good argument that Rule 11
can be used as a screening tool for pleadings. See Koly v. Enney, 269 F. App’x 861, 864
(11th Cir. 2008) (noting the deterrence function of Rule 11). However, this fails to take
into account that Rule 11 is only as good as the pleading standard that it enforces. Thus,
if an affirmative defense is held to Conley’s notice standard, the Rule 11 deterrent
function will necessarily be lesser than if affirmative defenses were held to Twombly’s and
Iqbal’s plausibility standard. See Samuels v. Wilder, 906 F.2d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that Rule 11 does not change the notice pleading standards of Conley); Donaldson
v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that Rule 11 under a notice
pleading regime does not require the parties to allege the facts on which the case is
based). Therefore, Rule 11 may have some deterrent effect, but it cannot be treated as a
substitute for a heightened pleading standard, but rather should be seen as a mechanism
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These concerns are not equally present in a plaintiff who has
been given years to decide when to file a complaint. Therefore,
as a plausibility standard unduly burdens a defendant, a lower
bar for a defendant is necessarily required to truly balance this
inequity.208
D. It Is Unfair to the Plaintiff to Hold the Defendant to a Notice
Standard Because the Plaintiff Still Needs to Conduct Discovery
A valid critique of this Comment’s proposed rule is that if
fairness to a defendant truly is the concern, then notice pleading
should be adopted as its requirements can be met by merely
labeling the affirmative defense correctly.209 However, notice
pleading allows the most liberal scope to be applied at the
discovery stage.210 A pleading system known for its ease of access
to discovery211 would allow a defendant adversely to affect a
plaintiff by pleading numerous affirmative defenses with “no
‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal
relevant evidence’ to support” the defense.212 In the Institute for
in which to enforce the applicable pleading standard. See Stephen R. Brown,
Reconstructing Pleading: Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited Role of the Plausibility Inquiry,
43 AKRON L. REV. 1265, 1298 (2010) (footnote omitted) (noting that Rule 11 is not a
pleading standard).
208 See Donoghue, supra note 199, at 11 (noting the inequity for plaintiffs and
defendants regarding the time to respond and file complaints under the Rules).
209 See, e.g., Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 16, 2009) (noting that simply listing the affirmative defense correctly may be
sufficient under a notice standard).
210 See Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit
and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 370 (1994) (discussing how broad
access to discovery can easily be abused and lead to the filing of claims with no merits).
See also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 201, at 388–89 (describing the Rule’s broad
discovery standards); William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1879 (2002) (noting the ease of access to discovery under the
Rules).
211 Rubenstein, supra note 210, at 1880. When compared to common law and code
pleading regimes, which focus on issue and factual development respectively, notice
pleading, which is not concerned with issue or factual development at the pleading stage,
has the easiest access to discovery of the three regimes. See Howard H. Wasserman, Civil
Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A Study in Section 1983 Procedure, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 806 (2003) (arguing that notice pleading is the broadest of the
pleading regimes, as it easily allows a party to make it past the pleadings and into
discovery).
212 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)). The concerns of the Twombly and Iqbal Courts
regarding the costs of discovery do not disappear by simply raising the standard for a
plaintiff only. The same issues that led the Court to abandon the notice pleading
standard of Conley would still survive if affirmative defenses were not held to a higher
standard. See Paul J. Cleary, Summary Judgment in Oklahoma: Suggestions for
Improving a “Disfavored” Procedure, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 251, 271 n.103 (1994) (“With
notice pleading and liberal amendment of pleadings, the motion to dismiss is an
ineffective tool for screening meritless cases.”);; Richard L. Marcus, Reining in the
American Litigator: The New Role of American Judges, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 3, 10 (2003) (arguing that fact pleading restricts what can be alleged and narrows
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the Advancement of the American Legal System survey, “[n]early
half the respondents said that notice pleading has become a
problem because extensive discovery is required to narrow the
claims and defenses . . . .”213 Thus, such a notice standard would
shift the scales dramatically and cause the plaintiff to be placed
at a disparate disadvantage.214 The plaintiff still needs to
conduct discovery, and as “the desire to avoid unnecessary
discovery applies with equal force” to plaintiffs and defendants,215
the defendant should not simply be allowed to throw any and all
defenses “up against a wall to see what sticks.”216 This mindset
is inconsistent with the Court’s current direction.217 Thus, this
Comment proposes a standard that will have both plaintiff and
defendant providing factual support for their complaints and
affirmative defenses, respectively.
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, proposing a standard that permits a defendant
to plead less than a plaintiff is at odds with certain notions of
fairness and equality. However, there are two definitive rules
that can be taken away from the Twombly and Iqbal decisions:
(1) only complaints are held to a plausibility standard;218 and (2)
the issues into “rather specific allegations”);; Paul J. McArdle, A Short and Plain
Statement: The Significance of Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
19, 45 (1994) (“It has been suggested that by reason of the increase in the number of civil
filings, the frequency of meritless or frivolous suits and the expense of federal litigation, it
is best that the notice pleading theory of Rule 8 and Conley be abandoned for a return to
fact pleading . . . .”). However, a fact pleading standard for an affirmative defense will
bring Rule 8(c) into line with the Court’s concerns regarding baseless claims and hopeless
discovery. See Taruffo, supra note 172, at 675 (“When . . . a strict fact pleading rule is
applied, much work has to be done by lawyers before filing a claim, and to decide whether
or not there are facts sufficient to support the claim.”).
213 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 166, at 4.
Furthermore, according to the same survey, “[m]ore than 76 percent said that answers to
complaints likewise do not accomplish the goal of narrowing issues.” Id.
214 See Mize, supra note 51, at 1260–61 (noting the imbalance in applying a lower
standard to a defendant than to a plaintiff); Jane Perkins, Pleading Standards After Iqbal
and Twombly, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 507, 513–14 (2010) (noting the inherent disparity
in applying such different standards to defendants and plaintiffs).
215 Lawrence-Hardy & Chapman, supra note 165.
216 A. Jennings Stone, III, Twombly and Iqbal: Good For Affirmative Defenses, Too?,
VIRGIN IS. L. BLOG (Nov. 16, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://lawblog.vilaw.com/2010/11/articles/
litigation/twombly-and-iqbal-good-for-affirmative-defenses-too/.
217 Furthermore, the plaintiff, although with time to investigate, would still have to
provide factual support to give a judge reason to believe the complaint is plausible, while
the defendant would have to do little more than list the name of the affirmative defense
correctly. Compare Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (holding that a
complaint must state “a plausible claim for relief”), with Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No.
6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2009) (holding that under a notice
standard, simply labeling the affirmative defense correctly may suffice). This alone
should cause one to hesitate to adopt such an inequitable standard for a defendant.
218 See supra Part IV(A) (noting the textual differences in Twombly, Iqbal, and
Conley).
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notice pleading is inadequate to deal with the costs of discovery
today.219 However, requiring a defendant to uncover enough
facts in twenty-one days to plead a plausible affirmative defense
is unfair as compared to a plaintiff who may have years in which
to plead a plausible claim for relief.220 Furthermore, holding an
affirmative defense to a plausibility standard forces an attorney
to make a decision between risking Rule 11 sanctions and risking
the possibility that a desirable affirmative defense will not be
plausible, and thus will be unavailable for trial and discovery.221
As a defendant may lose the right to plead that defense if it is
stricken or not pled from the outset,222 forcing such a
requirement upon a defendant will only serve to discourage a
true “decision on the merits.”223 It is also true though that
affirmative defenses cannot be held to a notice standard, as that
will inevitably conflict with the Court’s intention to use the
pleadings to combat discovery costs and that would be grossly
unfair to a plaintiff.224 Therefore, in order to remain fair to the
plaintiff and the defendant,225 to combat discovery costs,226 and to
remain consistent with Twombly and Iqbal,227 the only proper
standard is to require “the defendant to plead an adequate
factual basis for [his or her] affirmative defenses.”228

219

costs).

See supra Part IV(D) (describing notice pleading’s inability to combat discovery

220 See supra notes 192–202 and accompanying text (noting that such a high standard
is unfair to a defendant).
221 See supra notes 203–208 and accompanying text (discussing how Rule 11 and
waiver of affirmative defenses place defendant’s attorneys in difficult and unfair
positions).
222 See supra notes 200–202 and accompanying text (noting that defendants should
include any and all defenses in the responsive pleading because they may otherwise not
be allowed in as a defense).
223 Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
224 See supra notes 156–162 and accompanying text (noting the effects of adopting
notice pleading for defendants).
225 See supra Part IV(C) (noting the unfairness in applying Twombly and Iqbal to
affirmative defenses).
226 See supra Part IV(B) (explaining that the purpose and effect of pleading facts is to
provide the opposing party with enough information to efficiently narrow the scope of
discovery).
227 See supra Part IV(B) (noting that a fact pleading standard is most in line with the
policies behind the Twombly and Iqbal decisions).
228 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 268
(D. Minn. 2009).

